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Agenda item 32
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventieth year

Letter dated 18 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to convey Armenia's grave concern about the regular violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of Azerbaijan on the line of contact between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan and across the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, recorded for the month of May 2015 (see annex).

As a result of continued military provocations by Azerbaijan during the reporting period, six soldiers, namely, Volodya Vardanyan, Martin Goqoryan, Armen Gyozalyan, Manuk Tonyan, Valeri Ohanyan and Mnacakan Hovhanisyan, were wounded.

Armenia yet again strongly condemns the intentional ceasefire violations by Azerbaijan, their subversive operations and the deliberate targeting of civilians, which constitute a blatant violation of international humanitarian law. Armenia remains strongly committed to the peaceful resolution of the conflict through negotiations within the framework of the internationally established format of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-Minsk Group co-chairmanship.

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 32, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-10437 (E) 080715

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Annex to the letter dated 18 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-31 May 2015

In the framework of informational exchanges between the Ministries of Defence of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic according to operations data received from the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

1. On the line of contact between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan:

   Total number of violations: ~ 693

   Total number of shots: ~ 14,339

   AK (AKM) ~ 9,320, PK ~ 3,509, SVD ~ 725, DShK ~ 225, RPK ~ 9, Black arrow ~ 7, Istiglal ~ 380, Utyos (NSVP/NSVT) ~ 60, RPG-7 ~ 6, ZSU-23-2 ~ 50, AGS-17 ~ 36, F-1 ~ 1, 60 mm mortar ~ 6, 120 mm mortar ~ 5

2. On the borderline of the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of violations ~ 376

   Total number of shots ~ 4,256

   AK (AKM) ~ 1,593, PK ~ 1,591, SVD ~ 373, DShK ~ 244, RPK ~ 224, Black arrow ~ 231

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
1.	1 May	Agarak	0945	AKM	1	
2.		Koti	1100	Black arrow	1	
3.			1130	Black arrow	3	
4.				SVD	4	
5.			1130	PK	20	
6.		Chinari	1850	AKM	2	
7.		Vahan	2020	DShK	10	
8.				PK	20	

Abbreviations: AK (AKM), Kalashnikov rifle (7.62 mm/5.45); PK, Kalashnikov machine gun (7.62 mm); PKT, Kalashnikov tank machine gun; SVD, 7.62 mm sniper rifle; DShK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Black arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon; Istiglal, 14.5 mm sniper weapon; Utyos (NSVP, NSVT), 12.7 mm machine gun; RPG-7, anti-tank grenade launcher; AGS-17, 30 mm automatic grenade launcher; ZSU-23-2, 23 mm anti-aircraft weapon; SPG-9, anti-tank grenade launcher; F-1, hand grenade.

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
9.	2 May	Chinari	0055	AKM	5	At 1930, near the village of Verin Chaylu, on the line of contact, soldier Volodya Vardanyan, in the combat position, was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
10.			0140	SVD	1	
11.			0140	AKM	6	
12.			0325	SVD	3	
13.			0930	Black arrow	1	
14.				SVD	4	
15.		Eraskh	0215	AK	15	
16.		Aygedzor	1020	Black arrow	15	
17.				SVD	30	
18.				AK	50	
19.		Aygepar	1115	SVD	1	
20.		Mehrab	1925	Black arrow	15	
21.		Berqaber	1950	SVD	4	
22.		Aygehovit	2215	RPK	20	
23.		Shaghat	2220	AK	2	
24.	3 May	Barekamavan	1000	AKM	2	
25.		Vahan	1830	DShK	25	
26.				PK	30	
27.			2145	PK	30	
28.		Vazashen	1848	AKM	10	
29.			1930	AKM	5	
30.				PK	4	
31.		Azatamut	1940	AKM	15	
32.			2025	PK	25	
33.		Paravaqar	2010	AKM	2	
34.			2015	SVD	3	
35.				AKM	5	
36.			2220	AKM	1	
37.		Sevqar	2140	AK	8	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
38.		Chinari	2245		20	
39.		Movses	2335	AKM	4	
40.	4 May	Chinari	0830	Black arrow	2	
41.			1210		4	
42.			1720	AKM	4	
43.		Movses	1115	SVD	2	
44.		Paravaqar	1350	PK	30	
45.			2200	AKM	1	
46.		Kayanavan	1720	Black arrow	1	
47.		Voskepar	1720	AKM	4	
48.		Berqaber	2130		10	
49.	5 May	Azatamut	0725	SVD	4	
50.			1940	PK	4	
51.		Chinari	1445	SVD	3	
52.				AK	7	
53.			2150	AK	1	
54.		Movses	1500	SVD	2	
55.		Barekamavan	1525	Black arrow	5	
56.				PK	10	
57.		Agarak	1835	PK	10	
58.			2025	AK	1	
59.		Dovegh	2200	AK	25	
60.				PK	25	
61.		Verdavan		AK	20	
62.				PK	20	
63.		Paravaqar	2210	Black arrow	1	
64.	5 May	Berqaber	0355	PK	10	
65.		Azatamut	0925	Black arrow	1	
66.			1000	DShK	2	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
67.		Chinari	1025	AKM	2	
68.				SVD	3	
69.				RPK	5	
70.		Berdavan	1250	SVD	15	
71.		Movses	1400	AKM	1	
72.		Vahan	1520	DShK	30	
73.			1940	AKM	20	
74.		Koti	1530	Black arrow	4	
75.		Mehrab	2150	PK	30	
76.				AKM	50	
77.		Eraskh	2345	AKM	1	
78.	7 May	Vazashen	0120	Black arrow	20	At 1420, near the village of Kurapatkino, on the line of contact, soldier Martin Goqoryan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
79.		Barcruni	0855	AKM	8	
80.			0910		12	
81.		Agarak	1120	AKM	40	
82.				SVD	20	
83.			1730	SVD	2	
84.		Vahan	1245	Black arrow	5	
85.				PK	30	
86.		Kayanavan	1330	Black arrow	2	
87.				DShK	1	
88.		Shaghat	1620	AKM	15	
89.		Chinari	2120		3	
90.			2315		10	
91.		Sevakavan	2300		2	
92.		Paravaqar	2315		1	
93.	8 May	Shaghat	1310-1540	PK	58	
94.		Agarak	1315	PK	10	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
95.			1945		20	
96.			2010		40	
97.		Voskevan	1600	AKM	4	
98.		Baghanis	1630		30	
99.		Chinari	1940	SVD	3	
100.		Vahan	2235	PK	20	
101.		Eraskh	2300	AK	1	
102.		Azatamut	2330	DShK	10	
103.	9 May	N. Karmiraghbyur	0040	PK	5	
104.			2215	AK	4	
105.		Agarak	1230	PK	20	
106.				SVD	5	
107.		Koti	1415	SVD	5	
108.		Vahan	1625	Black arrow	20	
109.		Aygepar	2140	AK	15	
110.		Paravaqar	2230	PK	40	
111.	10 May	Eraskh	0105	PK	12	At 1215, near the village of Berqaber, soldier Armen Gyozalyan, in the combat position, was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
112.			2125	AKM	2	
113.		Aygehovit	0110	AK	6	
114.			0410	PK	5	
115.		Movses	1100	SVD	1	
116.			1235		4	
117.		Aygepar	1135	Black arrow	1	
118.		Berqaber	1215	SVD	1	
119.			1350	SVD	15	
120.				Black arrow	5	
121.			1950	SVD	20	
122.		Kayanavan	1430	DShK	3	
123.			1900		3	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
124.			1950	Black arrow	22	
125.		Vahan	1930	DShK	16	
126.		Chinari	2010	RPK	20	
127.	11 May	Eraskh	0015	SVD	1	
128.		Vazashen	0055	AK	15	
129.			2340	AKM	7	
130.		Berqaber	1100	PK	20	
131.				SVD	2	
132.			2120	SVD	4	
133.			2130		2	
134.		Berdavan	1720	SVD	4	
135.			1720		6	
136.		Movses	2015	AK	1	
137.		Sarigyugh	2130	PK	20	
138.	12 May	Chinari	0001	Black arrow	1	
139.			2150	AKM	6	
140.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0020	AKM	2	
141.			1600	SVD	8	
142.		Aygedzor	1130	AKM	50	
143.		Aygepar	1325	AK	4	
144.			1640	AKM	2	
145.			1850	SVD	1	
146.			1855		7	
147.			1915		10	
148.			2210		1	
149.			2215		1	
150.		Sarigyugh	1740	PK	20	
151.				AK	20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
152.	13 May	Aygepar	0023	AKM	1	
153.			1830	SVD	3	
154.		Movses	0325	AKM	1	
155.			1250	SVD	4	
156.		Vahan	1150	PK	30	
157.				Black arrow	5	
158.				SVD	8	
159.			1300	Black arrow	10	
160.		Aygedzor	1610	AK	100	
161.		Berqaber	1955	PK	50	
162.		Paravaqar	2045	AK	15	
163.		Vazashen	2050	DShK	30	
164.	14 May	Chinari	0015	AK	10	At 1010, near the village of Sarijali, on the line of contact, soldier Manuk Tonyan, in the combat position, was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
165.			1000	PK	30	
166.			1015	AK	10	
167.				SVD	5	
168.			1020	SVD	2	
169.			1030	RPK	8	
170.			1030	SVD	8	
171.			1110	RPK	10	
172.				PK	15	
173.			1120	RPK	20	
174.			1130	AK	6	
175.				DShK	15	
176.			2220	AKM	42	
177.			2300		2	
178.		Sevakavan	0020	AK	3	
179.		Agarak	0045	PK	30	
180.		Paravaqar	0110	PK	30	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
181.			0120		20	
182.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0200	PK	5	
183.			1140	AK	30	
184.				SVD	5	
185.			1250	PK	10	
186.		Aygedzor	1000	RPK	10	
187.				SVD	5	
188.		Aygepar	1646	AK	2	
189.		Sevqar	1530	PK	30	
190.		Movses	1915	AKM	4	
191.		Koti	2155	PK	4	
192.			2355		5	
193.	15 May	Koti	0030	AKM	4	
194.			1030	SVD	2	
195.		Berqaber	0330	DShK	14	
196.		Aygepar	0530	SVD	10	
197.		Vahan	1115	PK	30	
198.				SVD	10	
199.		Paravaqar	1250	AK	1	
200.		Khndzorut	1440		2	
201.		Kayanavan	1515	AK	5	
202.			2245	RPK	1	
203.		N. Karmiraghbyur	2000	SVD	3	
204.		Aygehovit	2245	AK	3	
205.		Eraskh	2035		3	
206.	16 May	Vazashen	0215	AK	5	
207.			0305		19	
208.		Sevakavan	1530	AK	3	
209.		Aygepar	1840	SVD	1	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
210.		Chinari	1945	SVD	1	
211.			2205	Black arrow	2	
212.		Movses	2115	SVD	1	
213.			2305		2	
214.		Eraskh	2030	PK	20	
215.	17 May	Vazashen	0145	PK	20	
216.		Paravaqar	0330	AK	23	
217.				PK	20	
218.				Black arrow	4	
219.			2045	Black arrow	2	
220.			2230	PK	10	
221.			2255	PK	50	
222.			2320	AK	30	
223.				PK	20	
224.		Aygepar	1145	SVD	4	
225.			1240		2	
226.		Chinari	1750	Black arrow	3	
227.			2140	PK	5	
228.			2145	SVD	9	
229.				PK	5	
230.	18 May	Chinari	0110	PK	20	At 2035, near the village of Kurapatkino, on the line of contact, soldier Valeri Ohanyan, in the combat position, was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
231.			1715	AK	6	
232.		Kayanavan	0115	AKM	3	
233.		Aygehovit	0115		8	
234.		Movses	0950	AK	2	
235.			1015	AK	1	
236.				SVD	1	
237.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1755	AK	3	
238.			1855	SVD	2	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
239.			2140	PK	10	
240.		Sarigyugh	1620	AK	2	
241.		Khndzorut	1720		4	
242.		Aygedzor	1930		5	
243.		Vazashen	1855	Black arrow	5	
244.		Agarak	1930	PK	8	
245.			2220	AK	3	
246.		Barekamavan	2225	PK	70	
247.		Eraskh	2120	AK	4	
248.			2125		4	
249.			2135		1	
250.			2140		6	
251.			2155		1	
252.	19 May	Eraskh	0100	AK	2	
253.			0105		2	
254.			0110		2	
255.			0205		2	
256.			0305		4	
257.			0305		1	
258.		Aygepar	0255	AK	5	
259.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0910	SVD	5	
260.		Paravaqar	1025	RPK	10	
261.			1100	AK	5	
262.			2215		1	
263.			2305		23	
264.		Movses	1920	SVD	2	
265.		Aygehovit	2145	Black arrow	1	
266.				AK	35	
267.	20 May	Berqaber	0010	AK	7	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
268.		Tandzut	0320		2	
269.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1000	AKM	9	
270.			1020	PK	40	
271.				AKM	35	
272.		Chambarak	2030	PK	20	
273.	21 May	Aygepar	0030	SVD	3	
274.		Eraskh	0015	AK	4	
275.			0015	AK	7	
276.			0440	AK	4	
277.		Aygehovit	0107	PK	30	
278.		Sarigyugh	0900	AKM	20	
279.		Chinari	1835	RPK	30	
280.				PK	15	
281.				AKM	10	
282.			1835	PK	20	
283.			1845	Black arrow	5	
284.		Khachik	1900	AKM	5	
285.				PK	5	
286.			1905	AKM	10	
287.			1910	PK	10	
288.				AKM	10	
289.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1910	AKM	20	
290.		Vazashen	2325	AKM	5	
291.	22 May	Vazashen	0003	SVD	12	
292.		Eraskh	0200	AKM	1	
293.		Paravaqar	1920	Black arrow	1	
294.				SVD	30	
295.		Movses	2220	AK	4	
296.		Aygepar	0330		2	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
297.		Koti	2200	AK	15	
298.				PK	5	
299.	23 May	Aygedzor	1955	PK	10	
300.				AK	20	
301.			2020	PK	40	
302.				Black arrow	15	
303.				AKM	60	
304.		Paravaqar	2210	AKM	30	
305.		Chinari	2225	DShK	4	
306.			2325	Black arrow	4	
307.				SVD	3	
308.	24 May	Movses	0005	AKM	6	
309.			2300		15	
310.		Chambarak	0510	AKM	5	
311.		Aygehovit	0930	SVD	4	
312.		Paravaqar	1255	Black arrow	2	
313.			1340		2	
314.		N. Karmiraghbyur	2100	AKM	5	
315.		Eraskh	2110	AK	3	
316.	25 May	Paravaqar	0005	PK	8	
317.			1140	SVD	4	
318.		Berqaber	2240	AK	5	
319.			2320		25	
320.	26 May	Eraskh	0118	AK	3	
321.		Berdavan	0440		30	
322.		Aygepar	1005	SVD	1	
323.		Chinari	1130	Black arrow	5	
324.			1245	SVD	9	
325.		Movses	1220	AKM	4	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
326.			2015		1	
327.		Paravaqar	2040	AKM	10	
328.		Aygedzor	2105	PK	40	
329.				Black arrow	20	
330.		Koti	2320	AKM	3	
331.	27 May	Chinari	1240	PK	20	
332.		Eraskh	2000	AKM	1	
333.			2035		1	
334.			2240		1	
335.			2250		3	
336.	28 May	Koti	0010	AKM	5	
337.		Vazashen	1245	AK	4	
338.		Paravaqar	1820		15	
339.		Eraskh	2035		1	
340.			2135		1	
341.		Aygehovit	2350		7	
342.	29 May	Koti	1405	AKM	10	At 1100, near the village of Jil, on the line of contact, soldier Mnacakan Hovhanisyan, in the combat position, was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
343.		Aygedzor	1630	Black arrow	3	
344.			2050	AKM	5	
345.			2120	DShK	50	
346.				PK	60	
347.				RPK	80	
348.		Chinari	1925	SVD	3	
349.			1940		3	
350.			2015		3	
351.		Voskevan	2100	AKM	5	
352.		Sevakavan	2145	AK	4	
353.		Agarak	2230	AKM	12	
354.		Kayanavan	2310	PK	15	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
355.			2345		30	
356.		Eraskh	2315	AK	2	
357.	30 May	Agarak	0040	PK	35	
358.			1540	RPK	10	
359.		Vazashen	1200	DShK	16	
360.		Paravaqar	1510	PK	15	
361.		Movses	2025	PK	8	
362.		Barcruni	2115		25	
363.		Voskevan	2300	AKM	25	
364.			2310		20	
365.			2340	PK	4	
366.		Koti	2300	AKM	10	
367.		Berqaber	2320		10	
368.	31 May	Agarak	0415	AK	10	
369.			0425	AKM	10	
370.			0520		10	
371.		Movses	0940	PK	1	
372.		Berqaber	1940	AK	7	
373.		Choporlu	1945	DShK	15	
374.				Black arrow	8	
375.		Cinari	2050	SVD	1	
376.				Black arrow	5	

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General Assembly
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General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 33
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 24 June 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 19 June 2015, regarding the ratification by the Russian State Duma of the so-called "treaty" between the Russian Federation and its occupation regime in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vakhtang **Makharoblishvili**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

15-10465 (E) 010715

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 24 June 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the ratification by the Russian State Duma of the so-called "treaty" between the Russian Federation and its occupation regime in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia

On 19 June 2015, the lower house of parliament of the Russian Federation, the State Duma, ratified the so-called "treaty on alliance and integration" signed between Moscow and its occupation regime in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia on 18 March 2015.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia condemns the ratification of the so-called "treaty on alliance and integration" and reiterates that this action represents a step towards the annexation of the integral territory of Georgia by the Russian Federation, in blatant violation of its international commitments, including those under the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008.

Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia is an integral part of Georgia and does not constitute a subject of international law. Any attempt to sign a so-called "treaty" with the Tskhinvali region is a flagrant violation of international law, devoid of legal consequences, in full breach of the fundamental norms and principles of international law, namely sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity and the fulfilment in good faith of international commitments.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia calls upon the international community to properly assess the step undertaken by the Russian Federation and exercise due pressure on that country. The firm and unanimous support of the international community will be of decisive importance as part of the efforts to bring an end to the destructive activities of the Russian Federation.

Tbilisi, 19 June 2015

United Nations S/2015/471

Security Council

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Angola, Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 2162 (2014) and 2219 (2015), and the statements of its President relating to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, resolutions 2188 (2014), 2190 (2014) and 2215 (2015) on the situation in Liberia and resolution 2164 (2014) on the situation in Mali,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire and recalling the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Recalling that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire bears primary responsibility for ensuring peace, stability and the protection of civilians in Côte d'Ivoire,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 7 May 2015 (S/2015/320),

Welcoming the progress being made in Côte d'Ivoire on the path of reconciliation, stability and economic recovery and commending the leadership of the President of Côte d'Ivoire in this regard,

Welcoming the continued improvement in the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, including in the western part of the country and along the border with Liberia, while *condemning* the attacks of 10 and 16 January 2015, *acknowledging* the need to address remaining challenges and *noting* the continued cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), as well as the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and countries in the subregion, in coordinating activities, including on security, in the border areas in the subregion,

Calling upon all Ivorian stakeholders, including political parties, civil society and the media, to work together to consolidate the progress made so far and to address the underlying causes of tension and conflict including with respect to land and nationality, *encouraging* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to further strengthen the rule of law, *welcoming* the steps taken by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to organize and finance the 2015 presidential election process, including reforms on the legal framework for elections through the adoption of amendments to this

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framework, *welcoming* the work undertaken by the Commission Électorale Indépendante, and *welcoming* the steps taken by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to facilitate an environment conducive to fair, credible, and transparent elections, while *underlining* the necessity to continue and intensify efforts in this field,

Welcoming the ongoing political dialogue among the political parties, including extra-parliamentary parties, *further welcoming* the decision by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, on an exceptional basis, to finance political parties ahead of the election, *commending* the engagement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General through her good offices mandate, especially in support of the dialogue between the Government and opposition political parties, and *expressing its appreciation* for the work of UNOCI and its overall contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire,

Taking note of the letter of 18 June 2014 of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to the Secretary-General requesting the possible provision of electoral assistance for the 2015 presidential election,

Welcoming the continued improvement of the humanitarian situation, including with regard to the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and *urging* the resumption of the voluntary, safe and durable return of refugees to their places of origin in Côte d'Ivoire,

Taking note of the final framework on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) adopted by the Autorité du DDR (ADDR) and the successful disarmament and demobilization of more than 50,000 former combatants, *welcoming* the initiative to enrol all former combatants in the disarmament and demobilization program by 30 June 2015 and *underlining* the need to continue efforts to include former combatants associated with the previous government, *taking note* of the continuing work of ADDR, with the support of UNOCI, in this regard, and *emphasizing* the need to implement post-June 2015 reinsertion activities in a coordinated manner, including through the designation by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire of a lead institution to achieve this objective,

Commending the efforts of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to restructure and professionalize its defence and security sector, including through the implementation of the National Security Strategy, *underlining* the need for the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to continue prioritizing efforts to implement completely its security sector reform strategy, with a special attention to the training and equipment of the police and gendarmerie as well as the streamlining of security structures, and *underlining* the importance of measures to rebuild confidence within and between the security forces and the population, including ahead of the 2015 presidential election,

Emphasizing the importance of pursuing a national reconciliation and social cohesion strategy, *welcoming* in this regard efforts to take forward inter-communal dialogue, encouraging the publication by the Government of Côte d'Ivoire of the final report and recommendations provided by the Commission dialogue, vérité et reconciliation (CDVR), *welcoming* the establishment of the Commission nationale pour la reconciliation et l'indemnisation des victimes (CONARIV), *encouraging* the full implementation of its mandate, and *underlining* the importance of including all Ivorians in the reconciliation process at the national and local levels,

Reiterating the vital role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and their key role in re-establishing the fabric of societies recovering from conflict, and *further reaffirming* the importance of implementing the Côte d'Ivoire National Action Plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) adopted in 2008,

Welcoming the efforts to improve the human rights situation, which led to progress in this field, including through the inauguration of the first national mechanism aimed at enhancing gender balance in all institutions, *further welcoming* the recent reform of the criminal code and the criminal procedure code, consistent with Côte d'Ivoire's international commitments, *while expressing its concern* about the continued reports, including those reported by the Secretary-General in his report of 7 May 2015 (S/2015/320), of human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, including against women and children, in particular sexual violence, *stressing* the importance of investigating and prosecuting such alleged violations and abuses, including those that occurred throughout the post-elections crisis committed by all parties, irrespective of their status or political affiliation,

Welcoming national and international efforts to bring to justice alleged perpetrators of violations and abuses of human rights and of violations of international humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire, *urging* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to increase and expedite its efforts to combat impunity and ensure equitable and independent justice without discrimination, and *encouraging* in this regard the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to continue its close cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC),

Expressing concern at reports about difficult conditions in detention, *calling* upon the Government to ensure that the conditions of detention are in line with international obligations and to take all steps necessary to prevent and investigate violations and abuse of human rights in the context of detention and *welcoming* the support provided by the European Union and France in this regard,

Commending the contribution of troop- and police-contributing countries and donors to UNOCI, underlining the importance of providing military troops and police officers qualified with appropriate specialized and linguistic skills,

Recognizing the continued contribution of the arms embargo, as defined by resolution 2219 (2015), to the stability of Côte d'Ivoire including by countering the illicit transfer, destabilization, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons,

Commending the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for their efforts to consolidate peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, and *encouraging* them to continue to support the Ivorian authorities in addressing key challenges, especially the underlying causes of recent conflict and insecurity in the border area, including the movement of armed elements and weapons, and promoting justice and national reconciliation,

Welcoming Côte d'Ivoire's ratification of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions on Statelessness and the steps being taken to revise its nationality laws, *welcoming* the important steps being taken by ECOWAS member states to address statelessness, including through the ministerial-level regional conference held in Abidjan from

23-25 February, 2015, and *recalling* the Secretary-General's decision on Durable Solutions and expressing support for the implementation of the national durable solution strategy for IDPs,

Determining that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

National reconciliation and social cohesion

1. *Welcomes* the resumption of the dialogue between the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the political opposition in December 2014, January and May 2015, *calls upon* all political parties to play a constructive role and contribute towards reconciliation;

2. *Commends* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for her good offices efforts and political support and *requests* that such important efforts and support continue, in particular with a view to the October 2015 presidential election, in line with paragraph 19 (b) of this resolution;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire continuing to pursue a national reconciliation and social cohesion strategy, particularly ahead of the October 2015 presidential election, through concrete measures to promote justice and reconciliation at all levels and involving all stakeholders and *calls for* a direct, open and constructive dialogue between the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and all political parties, including the opposition, to expedite further progress on crucial reforms on nationality and land;

4. *Welcomes* the work undertaken by the Commission Electorale Indépendante, *urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to continue to take all necessary steps to implement, in accordance with the existing time frame, the legal framework for the October 2015 presidential election, including the updating of the voters list and the allocation of adequate budgetary resources, as well as to continue its efforts to strengthen national logistical capacities to enable the organization and conduct of the election across the country, *calls upon* all national stakeholders to facilitate the creation of an environment conducive to the holding of free, fair, transparent, and inclusive presidential elections, as well as to refrain from acts that could incite violence, including hate speech, particularly through the media, and *affirms* its intention to pay close attention to such acts;

5. *Affirms* its intention to review the listing of individuals subject to the financial and travel measures imposed by paragraphs 9 to 12 of resolution 1572 (2004) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011) provided they engage in actions that further the objective of national reconciliation;

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)

6. *Calls upon* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to complete the DDR process before the presidential election of 2015 in accordance with the objective announced by the President of Côte d'Ivoire, *requests* UNOCI to facilitate the implementation of this process, including by continuing its technical support to the ADDR and relevant institutions, and swiftly disbursing support to the Ivorian DDR programme and *further calls* on Member States and regional and international

organizations to provide financial contributions to meet the needs of the DDR programme;

7. *Encourages* the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) to facilitate the planning and implementation of programmes which support this process, in consultation with UNOCI and international partners;

8. *Urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to provide for a transparent and inclusive DDR process that includes unregistered former combatants, *encourages* further efforts by the ADDR and relevant institutions to enhance the collection and disposal of weapons and ammunitions as part of the DDR process and *reiterates* the need for the Government to develop and implement long-term solutions to address the residual caseload of former combatants and for the sustained social and economic integration of former combatants, including former female combatants;

Security sector reform (SSR)

9. *Calls upon* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to accelerate the implementation of the national security sector reform strategy adopted in September 2012 and updated in 2014 with a view to setting up inclusive and accountable security forces that include an effective chain of command, a system of military justice and adequate and sustainable budgetary allocations;

10. *Underscores* in this regard the importance of accelerating the deployment of the police and gendarmerie to take over public order tasks currently performed by the Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) and other groups, including by equipping the police and gendarmerie with standard policing weapons and ammunition following the partial lifting of the arms embargo pursuant to its resolution 2153 (2014) and reaffirmed in resolution 2219 (2015);

11. *Reiterates its call* to the Government and all international partners, including private companies, involved in assisting the Government in the SSR process, to comply with the provisions of resolution 2219 (2015) and to coordinate their efforts with a view to promoting transparency and a clear division of labour between all international partners;

Human rights

12. *Strongly urges* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to ensure in the shortest possible time frame that, irrespective of their status or political affiliation, all those responsible for serious violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those committed during and after the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, are brought to justice in accordance with its international obligations and that all detainees receive clarity about their status in a transparent manner, and *urges* the Government to continue its cooperation with the ICC;

13. *Emphasizes*, in this regard, the importance of the work conducted by the National Commission of Inquiry and the CDVR, to lasting reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire, *encourages* the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to publish the final report and recommendations of the CDVR to contribute to such reconciliation, *calls for* the implementation and conclusion of related investigations, further *calls on* the Government to create the enabling environment to ensure that the work of the Ivorian judicial system is impartial, credible, transparent and consistent with

internationally agreed standards and, in this regard, *welcomes* the renewal of the Special Investigation and Examination cell, and *encourages* the Government to continue to provide it with the support it needs to conduct its investigations;

14. *Urges* the Government to take concrete and discernible steps to prevent and mitigate violence, including inter-communal tensions by seeking a broad national consensus on addressing effectively identity and land tenure issues;

15. *Welcomes* the work of the National Human Rights Commission, underscores the importance of its independence and its compliance with the Paris Principles related to the work of National Human Rights institutions and *calls* on UNOCI to continue to support Ivorian authorities and institutions in ensuring the human rights of all persons;

16. *Calls on* those responsible to cease committing acts of sexual and gender-based violence immediately, and *further calls upon* UNOCI, where consistent with its authorities and responsibilities, to continue to support national and international efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of serious violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire, irrespective of their status or political affiliation;

17. *Welcomes* the continued cooperation between, and the conduct of coordinated activities by, UNOCI and the defence and security forces, including the FRCI and *calls for* strict adherence by the defence and security forces, including the FRCI to international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws and in this context, *recalls* the importance of training in human rights, child protection and sexual- and gender-based violence for security and law-enforcement agencies;

UNOCI mandate

18. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNOCI until 30 June 2016;

19. *Decides* that the mandate of UNOCI shall be the following:

(a) Protection of civilians

- To protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Ivorian authorities, the civilian population from threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment and *welcomes* steps taken by UNOCI to move to a more preventive and pre-emptive posture in pursuit of its priorities and in active defence of its mandate, while underlining the need to continue such an effort, without prejudice to the agreed basic principles of peacekeeping;
- To implement the comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians in coordination with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT);
- To work closely with humanitarian agencies, particularly in relation to areas of tensions and with respect to the return of displaced persons, to collect information on and identify potential threats against the civilian population, and bring them to the attention of the Ivorian authorities as appropriate;

(b) Political support

- To provide, by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, good offices and political support for the efforts of the Ivorian authorities to address

the root causes of the conflict and establish lasting peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire, including in the priority areas of the SSR, DDR, and reconciliation processes at both the national and local levels;

– To provide, by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, good offices support to the Ivorian authorities for and throughout the 2015 electoral period, including by facilitating dialogue between all political stakeholders, inclusive of representatives of civil society and political parties;

– To assist the Government of Côte d'Ivoire with the 2015 presidential election process by providing limited logistical support, particularly to access remote areas, within existing resources and capabilities, at the request of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, while bearing in mind the primary responsibility of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire in this regard;

(c) Address remaining security threats and border-related challenges

– To support, within its existing authorities, capabilities, and its areas of deployment, the national authorities in stabilizing the security situation in the country, with a special attention to providing support for the provision of security through the 2015 presidential electoral period;

– To monitor and deter the activities of militias, mercenaries and other illegal armed groups and to support the Government in addressing border security challenges consistent with its existing mandate to protect civilians, including cross-border security and other challenges in the border areas, notably with Liberia, and to this end, to coordinate closely with UNMIL in order to further inter-mission cooperation, such as through undertaking coordinated patrols and contingency planning where appropriate and within their existing mandates and capabilities;

– To liaise with the Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) in order to promote mutual trust among all elements composing the FRCI;

(d) Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (DDR) and collection of weapons

– To assist the Government, in close coordination with other bilateral and international partners, in implementing, at the national and local levels, the national programme for the DDR of former combatants and dismantling of militias and self-defence groups, taking into account the rights and needs of the distinct categories of persons to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated, including children and women;

– To support the registration and screening of former combatants and assist in assessing and verifying the reliability of the listings of former combatants;

– To support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements, where relevant in cooperation with UNMIL and United Nations Country Teams in the region;

– To assist the national authorities, including the National Commission to fight against the Proliferation and Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in collecting, registering, securing and disposing of weapons and in clearing explosive remnants of war, as appropriate, in accordance with resolution 2219 (2015);

– To coordinate with the Government in ensuring that the collected weapons are not disseminated or re-utilized outside a comprehensive national security strategy, as referred to in point (e) below;

(e) Reconstitution and reform of security institutions

– To assist the Government in implementing, without delay and in close coordination with other international partners, its comprehensive national security strategy;

– To support the Government in providing effective, transparent and harmonized coordination of assistance, including the promotion of a clear division of tasks and responsibilities, by international partners to the security sector reform (SSR) process;

– To advise the Government, as appropriate, on SSR and the organization of the future national army, to facilitate the provision of training, within its current resources and as requested by the Government and in close coordination with other international partners, in human rights, child protection and protection from sexual and gender-based violence to the security and law enforcement institutions, as well as capacity-building support by providing technical assistance, co-location and mentoring programmes for the police and gendarmerie and to contribute to restoring their presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire and to promote trust and confidence within and between the security and law enforcement agencies and to offer support to the development of a sustainable vetting mechanism for personnel that will be absorbed into security sector institutions;

(f) Monitoring of the arms embargo

– To monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004), in cooperation with the Group of Experts established under resolution 1584 (2005), including by inspecting, as they deem it necessary and when appropriate without notice, all weapons, ammunition and related materiel regardless of location, consistent with resolution 2219 (2015);

– To collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel brought into Côte d'Ivoire in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004), and to dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate;

– To assist the Government, upon its request and within its existing resources, to ensure the Government's notification and approval requests contain the required information identified in paragraph 7 of resolution 2219 (2015) consistent with paragraph 9 of resolution 2219 (2015);

(g) Support for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law

– To contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire, with special attention to grave violations and abuses committed against children and women, notably sexual- and gender-based violence, in close coordination with the Independent Expert established under the Human Rights Council's resolution A/HRC/RES/17/21;

– To monitor, help investigate, and report to the Council, on abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law,

including those against children in line with resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) 2068 (2012) and 2143 (2014), in order to prevent such abuses and violations and to end impunity;

– To bring to the attention of the Council all individuals identified as perpetrators of serious human rights violations and to keep the Committee, established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004), informed of any significant developments in this regard when appropriate;

– To support the efforts of the Government in combating sexual- and gender-based violence, including through contributing to the implementation of a nationally owned multisectoral strategy in cooperation with UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict entities;

– To provide specific protection for women affected by armed conflict to ensure gender expertise and training, as appropriate and within existing resources, in accordance with resolutions 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009),1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013);

(h) Support humanitarian assistance

– To facilitate, as necessary, unhindered humanitarian access and to help strengthen the delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations, notably by contributing to enhancing security for its delivery;

– To support the Ivorian authorities in preparing for the voluntary, safe and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons in cooperation with relevant humanitarian organizations, and in creating security conditions conducive to it;

(i) Public information

– To continue to use UNOCI's broadcasting capacity, through ONUCI FM, to contribute to the overall effort to create a peaceful environment, through the 2015 presidential electoral period;

– To monitor any public incidents of incitement to hatred, intolerance and violence, and bring to the attention of the Council all individuals identified as instigators of political violence, and to keep the Committee established under resolution 1572 (2004) informed of any significant developments in this regard, when appropriate;

(j) Protection of United Nations personnel

– To protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;

20. *Authorizes* UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

21. *Decides* that the protection of civilians shall remain the priority of UNOCI, in accordance with paragraph 19 (a) above, and further *decides* that UNOCI shall continue to focus on supporting the Government on DDR, collection of weapons and SSR, in accordance with paragraphs 19 (d) and (e) of this resolution, with the objective of transitioning security responsibilities from UNOCI to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire;

22. *Requests* UNOCI to ensure that any support provided to non-United Nations security forces is provided in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (HRDDP);

Force structure

23. *Decides* that the authorized ceiling of UNOCI's military component shall remain at 5,437 military personnel, comprising of 5,245 troop and staff officers and 192 military observers;

24. *Decides* that the authorized ceiling of UNOCI's police component shall remain at 1,500 personnel, and *further decides* to maintain the 8 customs officers previously authorized;

25. *Reaffirms its intention* to consider further downsizing UNOCI, reviewing its mandate and its possible termination after the October 2015 presidential election based on security conditions on the ground and the capacity of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to take over UNOCI's security role;

26. *Acknowledges* the importance of the reconfiguration of UNOCI's military presence and resources to in high-risk areas, *expresses support* for the mobile concept of operations of UNOCI's military component, and *requests* UNOCI to continue to update its configuration in this regard, with a view to focusing on the west and other high-risk areas as appropriate, while continuing its shift to a more mobile posture and enhancing its situational awareness and early warning capabilities;

27. *Requests* UNOCI to focus and continue to streamline its activities, across its military, police and civilian components in order to achieve progress on the tasks outlined in paragraph 19 above;

French Forces

28. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 2016 the authorization that the Security Council provided to the French Forces in order to support UNOCI, within the limits of their deployment and their capabilities;

29. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of UNOCI and of the French Forces, which support it, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Côte d'Ivoire to enable them to fully carry out their mandates;

Regional and inter-mission cooperation

30. *Calls on* the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia to continue reinforcing their cooperation, particularly with respect to the border area, including through increased monitoring, information-sharing and coordinated actions, and to implement the shared border strategy to inter alia support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements on both sides of the border and the voluntary and safe repatriation of refugees as well as to address the root causes of conflict and tension;

31. *Affirms* the importance of inter-mission cooperation arrangements as UNMIL and UNOCI downsize, *reaffirms* the inter-mission cooperation framework set out in its resolution 1609 (2005) and *further recalls* its endorsement in its resolution 2062 (2012) of the recommendation of the Secretary-General to transfer

three armed helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI to be used in both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia along and across their border and *reaffirms* its decision in its resolution 2162 (2014) that all UNOCI and UNMIL military utility helicopters shall be utilized in both Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia in order to facilitate rapid response and mobility, while not affecting the area of responsibility of either mission;

32. *Welcomes* the full operationalization of the quick reaction force established by resolution 2162 (2014) to implement UNOCI's mandate as defined in paragraph 19 of this resolution and to support UNMIL as defined in paragraph 33 of this resolution while recognizing that this unit will remain primarily a UNOCI asset, and *requests* the Secretary General, in the context of inter-mission cooperation arrangements between UNMIL and UNOCI, to continue to maintain such a unit for a period of one year and within the authorized military strength of UNOCI;

33. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to deploy this unit to Liberia, subject to the consent of the troop-contributing countries concerned and the Government of Liberia, in the event of a serious deterioration of the security situation on the ground in order to temporarily reinforce UNMIL with the sole purpose of implementing its mandate, and *stresses* that this unit should prioritize implementation of UNOCI's mandate in Côte d'Ivoire;

34. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council immediately of any deployment of this unit to Liberia and to obtain Security Council authorization for any such deployment for a period that exceeds 90 days;

35. *Calls upon* all United Nations entities in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, including all relevant components of UNOCI and UNMIL, within their respective mandates, capabilities and areas of deployment, to enhance their support for the stabilization of the border area, including through increased inter-mission cooperation and the development of a shared, strategic vision and plan, in support of the Ivorian and Liberian authorities and support for implementing regional security strategies, including those of the Mano River Union and ECOWAS;

36. *Commends* inter-mission cooperation between UNOCI and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and encourages both United Nations missions to continue in this direction as authorized by paragraph 25 of its resolution 2164 (2014);

Reporting

37. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and the implementation of the mandate of UNOCI and to provide to it a midterm report on the situation on the ground and the implementation of this resolution no later than 15 December 2015, and which includes options to implement by 31 March 2016 the elements contained in paragraph 65 of his report of 15 May 2014 (S/2014/342) and *affirms* its intention to consider these options, pursuant to the successful conduct of the 2015 presidential election process, and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide to the Council no later than 31 March 2016 a report containing recommendations consistent with paragraph 25 above, with the view to possible termination, to be considered by the Security Council taking into account the situation in Côte d'Ivoire;

38. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

I. Introduction

1. In a letter dated 23 December 2013 (S/2013/759), the President of the Security Council informed me of the Council's concurrence with my recommendation to extend the mandate of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) until 31 December 2016, and requested that I report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the mandate.

2. The present report covers the period from 1 January to 30 June 2015. It provides an overview of developments and trends in West Africa and outlines the activities undertaken by UNOWA in the areas of good offices, enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security and promoting good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights and gender mainstreaming. It also outlines the efforts of UNOWA in engaging regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Mano River Union, in order to promote peace and stability in West Africa.

II. Developments and trends in West Africa

3. Since the issuance of my last report (S/2014/945), there have been a number of key political and security developments in West Africa, particularly in countries that have held or plan to hold elections in 2015. In Nigeria, the presidential, legislative, gubernatorial and state assembly elections were conducted in a generally peaceful manner, despite the high political stakes and continuing insecurity in the north-east of the country. Presidential elections in Togo and legislative and local elections in Benin took place in a peaceful manner, notwithstanding reported technical and organizational challenges. In Guinea, tensions between the Government and the opposition escalated over the proposed sequence of the elections. In Burkina Faso, the Government's approval of an amended electoral code, which excludes some individuals associated with the ousted regime from contesting the elections, led to renewed tensions. In Sierra Leone, tensions within the ruling party led to the dismissal of Vice-President Samuel Sam-Sumana.

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4. Challenges related to transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and cross-border security threats in the Sahel continued to affect West Africa. Among the most serious threats were the continuing attacks by violent extremists in Mali, as well as the Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria that affected the security of the Lake Chad Basin countries. On a positive note, the operational headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force, established to combat Boko Haram, was inaugurated in N'Djamena on 25 May, on the margins of the sixteenth ordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

5. The global response to eliminate the Ebola outbreak in the three most-affected countries, namely Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, recorded significant achievements. On 9 May, Liberia was declared free of Ebola transmission following a period of 42 days during which no cases of new infection were reported. There were also reductions in the reported number of cases of the disease in Guinea and Sierra Leone, although a "state of health emergency" remains in effect in the two countries.

A. Political developments

6. In Nigeria, presidential and legislative elections were held on 28 March, and gubernatorial and state assembly elections took place on 11 April. Fourteen candidates, including one woman candidate, contested the presidential elections. The opposition candidate for the All Progressives Congress, Muhammadu Buhari, won 54 per cent of the presidential votes, while the incumbent President, Goodluck Jonathan of the People's Democratic Party, garnered 45 per cent of the votes. Despite heightened tensions in the lead-up to the elections and strong apprehensions regarding the possibility of violence, the elections were assessed by international and national observers as being generally peaceful and transparent.

7. President Jonathan's concession of defeat on 31 March, hours before the final results were announced, played a role in preventing post-election violence in Nigeria. In conceding, he reaffirmed his commitment to free and fair elections and to peacefully accepting the outcome of the electoral process as agreed to by all presidential candidates in the Abuja accord signed on 14 January and as renewed in their collective pledges on 26 March. My Special Representative for West Africa and High-level Representative to Nigeria, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Nigeria, supported the National Peace Committee, chaired by former Head of State and retired General Abdulsalami Abubakar, in the preparation and facilitation of the signing of the Abuja accord.

8. The determination of ordinary Nigerians to vote, the integrity and professionalism of the Independent National Electoral Commission, led by Chairman Attahiru Jega, and the introduction of various safeguards to ensure the integrity of polling together contributed to the peaceful holding of the general elections. In addition, the increased engagement and coordinated messaging of regional and international actors also played a key role. In the lead-up to, during and after the elections, I spoke with both Mr. Jonathan and Mr. Buhari periodically and issued statements aimed at reducing tensions and encouraging all parties to engage in credible and peaceful elections. I also dispatched the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to Nigeria from 16 to 18 March, accompanied by my Special

Representative, to convey similar messages to national stakeholders. He also made frequent trips to Nigeria in the lead-up to the elections and remained in the country for several days during the presidential and legislative elections until the final announcement of the results. On 29 May, Mr. Buhari was sworn in as the new President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

9. In Guinea, political tensions between the Government and the opposition escalated following the announcement of the electoral calendar by the Independent National Electoral Commission on 10 March. According to the calendar, the presidential elections are scheduled to take place on 11 October 2015, while the local elections will be held in March 2016. The opposition immediately rejected the proposed sequence of the elections, insisting that local elections must precede the presidential elections. They argued that the majority of mayors appointed by the ruling party had overstayed their mandate by more than six years. On 17 March 2015, the opposition withdrew their representatives from the National Assembly, declared that they no longer recognized the Independent National Electoral Commission and its decisions and announced the resumption of public demonstrations. Since then, several protest rallies have been organized throughout the country, including in the capital city, Conakry, which, in some cases, has resulted in clashes between protesters and national security forces. Several injuries and deaths have been reported during these clashes.

10. Meanwhile, the Government of Guinea maintained that the presidential election should be held in 2015 to avoid a potential constitutional crisis. They argued that they could only hold one election in 2015, owing to budgetary constraints and the need to focus on the ongoing fight against Ebola. On 20 May, President Alpha Condé met with opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo. The opposition welcomed the initiative. On 5 June, on instructions from the President, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Defence and the Secretary-General of the Presidency held consultations with the opposition, during which it was tentatively agreed that a national dialogue would commence on 18 June. In another development, on 11 May, the former military Head of State, Dadis Camara, who is in exile in Burkina Faso, announced his intention to run in the presidential election in Guinea.

11. In Burkina Faso, the process of transition following the popular uprising of October 2014 remains on track. On 27 January 2015, the Council of Ministers confirmed that presidential and legislative elections would be held on 11 October 2015, and municipal elections would be held on 31 January 2016. Preparations for the elections in October 2015 are well under way. In the wake of tensions related to the reorganization of the presidential guard, members of the presidential guard, on 4 February, called for the resignation of Transitional Prime Minister Yacouba Isaac Zida, which triggered street demonstrations in support of the dissolution of the presidential guard. Following intensive consultations between political and military leaders and appeals by members of the international community, the parties agreed to address the reform of the presidential guard at a later stage. On 16 February, 26 parties of the former opposition founded the Cadre de concertation des partis politiques to monitor and track problems in the transitional process and to support the organization of transparent and credible elections.

12. On 7 April, the National Transitional Council of Burkina Faso adopted a controversial law modifying the electoral code, which banned from contesting the

upcoming elections all those who supported an unconstitutional change, challenging the principle of democratic alternation, especially the limitation of the number of presidential mandates leading to an insurrection or to any other form of uprising. The law was promulgated by Transitional President Michel Kafando on 9 April. In reaction to the adoption of this amendment, several parties aligned with the former majority coalition, the Congress for Democracy and Progress, announced their withdrawal from transitional institutions. On 15 April, parties from the former majority coalition also lodged an appeal against the amendment in the Constitutional Court. However, on 5 May, the Court rejected the appeal on technical grounds.

13. In Sierra Leone, political tensions increased following the expulsion of Vice-President Sam-Sumana from the ruling All People's Congress on 7 March and his dismissal as Vice-President on 17 March on the grounds that he no longer satisfied the constitutional requirement of being a member of a political party. In response, Mr. Sam-Sumana filed an action contesting his dismissal. Opposition and civil society groups also expressed concern over his dismissal and organized demonstrations. On 20 March, a former Secretary-General of the All People's Congress, Victor Bockarie Foh, was sworn in as the new Vice-President of Sierra Leone. An injunction filed by Mr. Sam-Sumana on 23 March to prevent Mr. Foh from acting in the office of the Vice-President was rejected by the Supreme Court on 5 May. The Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of Mr. Sam-Sumana's removal from office.

14. In Togo, the presidential election held on 25 April was won by incumbent President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé. On 28 April, the opposition party, the Combat pour l'alternance politique, rejected as fraudulent the preliminary results announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission and declared the leader of the party, Jean-Pierre Fabre, to be the winner of the election. On 3 May, the Constitutional Court confirmed the election victory of President Gnassingbé. The opposition has claimed that it will not challenge the results of the election in the Constitutional Court because of its bias in favour of President Gnassingbé.

15. In Benin, legislative elections were conducted on 26 April in a peaceful manner despite the sociopolitical tensions that had preceded the polls. The ruling alliance, the Forces cauris pour un Bénin emergent, won 33 of the 83 seats, 8 seats less than in the previous elections. The other contesting opposition parties and coalitions, the Union fait la nation, the Parti du renouveau démocratique, the Renaissance du Bénin and the Forces démocratiques unies, won 13, 10, 7 and 4 seats, respectively. Some opposition parties accused the ruling coalition of fraud and of using the state apparatus in its campaign. The Constitutional Court proclaimed the final results of the legislative elections on 3 May. On 19 May, the Constitutional Court authorized the postponement of the local elections until 28 June.

B. Security trends

16. The security situation in West Africa remains fragile. In Mali, clashes between armed groups and attacks by armed groups against the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and government forces increased.

17. The activities of Boko Haram against civilians in the north-east of Nigeria peaked in the first half of the reporting period. On 3 January, the group conducted

an attack on the remote town of Baga, Borno State, which destroyed the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force. Following the withdrawal of military forces from the area, Boko Haram reportedly killed several hundred civilians. On 25 January, Boko Haram fighters launched an attempt to take over Maiduguri but were eventually repelled after a protracted confrontation with Nigerian security forces. During the first quarter of 2015, at least 24 incidents of suicide bombings took place in the states of Yobe (8 incidents), Gombe (5), Kani (1) and Borno (10); the incidents involved 31 suicide bombers, 4 of whom were reported to be children. Meanwhile, sporadic insurgency attacks have continued in north-east Nigeria.

18. The Niger continues to face security risks, particularly in areas along its borders with Libya, Mali and Nigeria. From 8 to 12 February, Boko Haram insurgents launched a succession of cross-border attacks, including three suicide attacks, on the border cities of Bosso and Diffa, in the Niger. On 25 April, Boko Haram militants attacked Karamga, a strategic island in Lake Chad, killing at least 50 soldiers and prompting the Government of the Niger to order the evacuation of all inhabited islands prior to a large-scale military operation in the area. On 6 May, militants raided the border town of Koukodou in the Niger, where at least five people were killed. Since the beginning of the year, the authorities of the Niger have witnessed a dramatic increase in refugees and returnees to the south-western region of Diffa. The overpopulation of Diffa, the unstable security environment and limited humanitarian access and resources have led to increased tension within local communities. This has been compounded by concerns over the possible infiltration of Boko Haram militants in the area and the group's recruitment of fighters from among the returnees and refugees.

19. In late February and March, coordinated operations of forces from Chad, the Niger and Nigeria succeeded in wresting a number of locations from Boko Haram's control. On 18 February, Monguno and Marte in Borno State were retaken by the Nigerian military, which also seized the town of Baga in Borno State four days later. On 2 February, Chadian forces recaptured the strategic border town of Gamboru, followed by Dikwa on 2 March and Damasak on 9 March, all located in Borno State. Nigerian forces took over Bama and Gwoza, Borno State, on 16 and 27 March, respectively. In April, the Nigerian army commenced operations in the Sambisa forest. Between 28 April and 6 May, a spokesperson for the Nigerian army announced the freeing of at least 787 women and children who had been kidnapped by Boko Haram. More than 20 makeshift camps, previously used by Boko Haram elements in the area, were reported to have been destroyed during the operation. The total number of freed Boko Haram hostages reached approximately 1,000 at the end of May and has continued to increase since then. Recent information suggests that the capabilities of Boko Haram were significantly reduced as a result of joint regional military efforts under the Multinational Joint Task Force. Nonetheless, the group remains active.

20. There was evidence of transatlantic drug trafficking during the reporting period. On 15 January, the Spanish navy intercepted a shipment of 1.5 tons of cocaine in the Atlantic Ocean, 80 miles west of Cabo Verde, on a vessel en route to the Canary Islands, Spain. On 20 April, authorities in the Niger intercepted a shipment of nearly 3 tons of cannabis that was being escorted by a group of heavily armed smugglers in the mountains in the northern part of the country. In April, the transnational organized crime unit in Sierra Leone supported an international

investigation to determine the origin of 9 tons of cannabis resin ("hashish") that had been seized on a ship navigating under a Sierra Leonean flag in Moroccan waters. Trafficking in amphetamine-type stimulants also remains a major source of concern in West Africa; 120 kilograms of amphetamine-type stimulants were seized in the subregion during the reporting period.

C. Humanitarian trends

21. The humanitarian situation in West Africa remains a matter of great concern, largely due to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the impact of the Ebola outbreak on Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the Sahel, some 20 million people continue to struggle with food insecurity. In February, partners launched the Sahel response plan for 2015, seeking $1.96 billion to assist 9.3 million food-insecure people, 9 million people at risk of epidemics and 3.2 million acutely malnourished children, as well as to provide safe water and sanitation for over 4 million people in nine countries.

22. Violence and conflict have triggered a new surge in large-scale displacements in the Lake Chad Basin area. In the north-east of Nigeria, nearly 1.5 million people have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency, an increase of 28 per cent since the start of the year. Nearly 60 per cent of those displaced are persons under 18 years old. The majority of those displaced persons live in host communities, and the remainder live in camps or camp-like sites. Meanwhile, food insecurity has worsened, and in the coming months some 3 million Nigerians in the north-east are expected to require assistance. An estimated 157,000 refugees and 53,000 returnees have fled to Cameroon, Chad and the Niger, putting an additional strain on highly vulnerable host communities. Insecurity and logistical constraints continue to hamper humanitarian access in Nigeria, particularly in areas liberated from Boko Haram by the Multinational Joint Task Force.

23. The Niger continues to be one of the countries in the Sahel that are the most vulnerable to malnutrition. Food insecurity has affected 2.5 million people, representing 15 per cent of the rural population. In the Diffa region, insecurity and an influx of people fleeing the Boko Haram insurgency have exacerbated a situation that is already fragile due to the poor agricultural season. The vast majority of the 66,000 internally displaced persons and 105,600 refugees from Nigeria live with host families and have very limited access to humanitarian assistance. To compound the situation, the meningitis outbreak in Niamey and in the Dosso region has reached an epidemic level, with over 6,000 suspected cases since the beginning of 2015, compared with 154 cases in 2014.

24. The Ebola outbreak has generated immense needs in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, though the number of cases has significantly decreased. The disease has left more than 16,000 children without one or both parents, while 5 million have been deprived of learning opportunities due to school closures. More than 1.2 million people are currently food-insecure and require immediate assistance. Moreover, over 2.2 million people risk experiencing critical levels of food insecurity during the lean season. The United Nations is preparing to host a high-level meeting on 9 and 10 July to support post-Ebola recovery coordination and resource mobilization efforts.

D. Trends on human rights

25. Despite positive developments related to the conduct of peaceful elections in a number of countries, the human rights situation in West Africa remains fragile. Recurrent strikes throughout the subregion have restricted the right to education of a generation of youth in a period marked by high unemployment. While increased sensitization regarding Ebola has raised awareness, identity-based discrimination and stigmatization, including a ban on pregnant girls attending school in Sierra Leone, are matters of concern. On 23 March, the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone warned about the discriminatory imposition of a state of emergency due to the Ebola outbreak, which, according to the Commission, restricted the right to freedom of assembly and the right to freedom of association.

26. In Nigeria, the indiscriminate violence and killing of civilians by Boko Haram have continued. Several mass graves and execution sites have been discovered following the recapture of areas that were under the control of Boko Haram. Moreover, children have continued to be recruited and abducted by the group, while women and young girls are increasingly being used as sex slaves and for suicide attacks. There were also reports of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by Nigerian security forces during counter-insurgency operations. On 17 February, an unidentified plane bombed a funeral gathering near a mosque in the village of Abadam in the Niger, reportedly killing 36 civilians. In Nigeria, the recruitment and use of children by the civilian joint task force in Borno State and other militia in the states of Adamawa and Yobe were also reported. The approximately 1,000 women and children liberated by Nigerian forces in areas previously under the control of Boko Haram are reportedly being provided with support for rehabilitation and reintegration into their communities. On 25 May, the long-awaited bill on the prohibition of violence against persons became law, providing a legal framework for the prevention of all forms of violence against vulnerable persons, especially women and girls. It prohibits female genital mutilation, the abandonment of spouses, children and other dependants without sustenance, battery and other harmful traditional practices against women and children.

27. In Mauritania, human rights groups called for the release of anti-slavery activists, including Biram Dah Abeid, the winner of the United Nations Prize in the Field of Human Rights and leader of the Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement, who had been arrested following demonstrations in November 2014. The use of excessive force also remains a matter of concern in other countries, notably in Guinea, where the intervention by security forces during opposition demonstrations between April and May 2015 led to fatalities.

28. In the Gambia, dozens of military personnel and civilians, including the family members of those accused of being involved in an attempted coup d'état that had taken place on 30 December 2014, were arrested, questioned and detained without charge. The National Intelligence Agency of the Gambia reportedly conducted door-to-door searches in the days following the incident. On 2 April 2015, following a court martial, three of the military officers involved in the incident were sentenced to death, while three others received sentences of life imprisonment. In a separate case, the trials of three men accused of "homosexual acts" are taking place. The men face up to 15 years of imprisonment if found guilty. Prior to their transfer to prison, the men were reportedly subjected to acts of torture during their detention at the headquarters of the National Intelligence Agency.

29. In Guinea, on 2 June, the National Assembly passed a bill aimed at regulating the use of force during demonstrations. The National Assembly also passed a bill introducing penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for offending or defaming the President and other public officials. Both bills passed in the absence of the opposition, which had withdrawn its representatives from the legislative body in protest over the electoral calendar announced by the Independent National Electoral Commission.

E. Trends on gender issues

30. Some progress was achieved in the political and electoral participation of women in West Africa during the reporting period. Several countries, including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, increased the number or the position of women in their electoral management bodies. Women's civil society groups were involved in the electoral process in Benin, Nigeria and Togo, including through the "women's situation rooms" that were set up during the recent elections in those countries. In Togo, President Gnassingbé appointed Amadou Abdou-Nana Awa-Daboya as the chairperson of a commission on political, institutional and constitutional reforms. In Benin and the Niger, steps were taken to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and support was requested from UNOWA in the mobilization of financial and human resources for the adoption and implementation of the national action plans.

F. Socioeconomic trends

31. The Ebola outbreak has continued to negatively affect local economies, cross-border trade, farming activities and production industries in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. According to World Bank estimates, on 17 April, the total loss of gross domestic product in the affected countries reached $2.2 billion. The Ebola outbreak has also disrupted the countries' progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, collecting taxes and investing in infrastructure and social services.

32. Overall, the reporting period saw a considerable slackening in the mining sector in West Africa, which further aggravated unemployment and affected state revenues. The lull in construction and other employment-generating activities, including in the informal sector, continued to have a significant impact on livelihoods, especially affecting women, youth and poor rural households.

33. Challenges linked to climate change and successive droughts, as well as lack of opportunities for youth, contributed to increased migration. In May 2015, the International Organization for Migration reported that Gambians, Malians, Nigerians and Senegalese accounted for most of the persons migrating from West Africa to Europe.

34. The education sector in some countries in West Africa was negatively affected by strikes or quarantine measures resulting from the Ebola outbreak, leading to an extension of the school year in some countries. Among the countries affected were Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

35. During the reporting period, ECOWAS launched the sea link initiative, which is aimed at operationalizing maritime shipping and minimizing the challenges related to the movement of people, goods and services in the subregion. The initiative, which will link West African and Central African countries, is expected to boost trade and enhance economic growth in West Africa.

III. Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa

A. Good offices and special assignments by my Special Representative

Nigeria

36. Given the increasing political tensions in the lead-up to the presidential, legislative, gubernatorial and state assembly elections in Nigeria in March and April, my Special Representative for West Africa travelled regularly to the country to engage with national stakeholders with a view to defusing tensions, supporting efforts to prevent election-related violence and encouraging efforts to combat Boko Haram. He held a series of consultations with key political figures, human rights actors, civil society representatives, religious leaders, the Sultan of Sokoto, the Bishop of Sokoto and the heads of military, intelligence and security agencies. He also participated in the inaugural meeting of the National Peace Committee on 25 January.

37. From 15 March to 4 April, my Special Representative remained in Nigeria, working closely with the heads of electoral observer missions from the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and the Commonwealth, as well as international partners, as part of efforts to coordinate support for peaceful elections in Nigeria and support of relevant national authorities. He also worked closely with the United Nations country team, which provided technical support for the elections, in addition to carrying out its broader mandated activities.

Guinea

38. During the reporting period, my Special Representative conducted several missions to Guinea to support efforts to defuse tension and encourage political dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition. In his meetings with President Condé, government ministers, members of the opposition parties and the ruling coalition, he reiterated the need to maintain national unity and cohesion and ensure the necessary conditions to respond to the Ebola outbreak. He also emphasized the need to build a political atmosphere conducive to the holding of peaceful, inclusive and credible elections.

39. From 23 to 26 April, an electoral needs assessment mission of the United Nations visited Guinea at the invitation of the Government. The mission concluded that the conditions were not conducive to the holding of the local elections because of, inter alia, the lack of consensus on the electoral calendar. Nonetheless, the mission recommended that the United Nations provide technical assistance and support donor resource mobilization pending the resolution of the issues related to the electoral calendar.

40. My Special Representative will continue to work closely with national stakeholders and international partners to help defuse tension and build confidence

prior to the elections. He deployed a small team to Guinea on 23 May to assist in monitoring developments in the country and to provide advisory support to the Resident Coordinator.

Burkina Faso

41. In Burkina Faso, my Special Representative continued to support the process of transition, in close coordination with regional and international stakeholders. The International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso, co-chaired by my Special Representative along with the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, Smail Chergui, and the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, met in Ouagadougou on 13 January and 30 March and in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 12 June. During the meetings, participants expressed satisfaction with the progress made in the transitional process.

42. On 4 February, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, accompanied by my Special Representative, visited Burkina Faso to hold consultations with the transitional authorities and representatives of political parties and civil society. The visit coincided with growing tensions in the country following a request by the presidential guard for the resignation of Transitional Prime Minister Zida. The two officials emphasized that the international community would not tolerate any obstacles to the successful completion of the transition in Burkina Faso and called on all parties to ensure that the transitional process remained on track.

43. An electoral needs assessment mission was deployed to Burkina Faso in January following a request from the Transitional Government for United Nations assistance. The mission identified four areas in which increased technical and operational assistance would need to be provided to the national electoral institutions. There is currently a budgetary shortfall of $30 million in the $9[illegible] million election budget. The United Nations will continue to support efforts to mobilize resources to fill the funding gap, including through the International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso.

Sierra Leone

44. In response to the political tensions in Sierra Leone over the dismissal of former Vice-President Sam-Sumana, my Special Representative travelled to Freetown on 21 March to meet with President Ernest Bai Koroma and Mr. Sam-Sumana, as well as international stakeholders, and convey my concern that political upheavals should not distract from the ongoing Ebola response and recovery efforts and reiterate the importance of maintaining national cohesion and respect for the Constitution. The President gave his assurances that the Government remained focused on the fight against Ebola and would work towards de-escalating tension. Mr. Sam-Sumana also gave assurances that he would pursue a resolution of the matter through legal means.

Togo

45. My Special Representative travelled to Togo with the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union on 12 January and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs on 3 February, with a view to urging political stakeholders to engage in peaceful and transparent elections. He visited Lomé again from 27 to

30 April with the objective of consulting with all relevant political and electoral stakeholders to defuse tensions prior to the announcement of the election results. He met with key national stakeholders, including the Independent National Electoral Commission and opposition candidate Jean-Pierre Fabre. That was done in close coordination with the African Union, ECOWAS and international observer missions present in the country.

Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

46. Notwithstanding the security challenges related to Boko Haram, the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission made significant progress in resolving outstanding areas of disagreement between the two parties. Field assessments and demarcations were conducted relying principally on cartographic methodologies. Agreement was reached on coordinates extending over 2,001 kilometres of the land boundary, which significantly enhances prospects for the completion of the demarcation without further field assessments. The parties also agreed on coordinates for the emplacement of the remaining 1,800 pillars, which will complete the physical demarcation of the entire Cameroon-Nigeria land boundary. To date, 896 pillars have been put into position or are subject to current action. A joint technical team conducted an inspection mission from 10 January to 16 February to review the condition of pillars positioned in the southernmost part of the Nigerian boundary. The inspection mission confirmed that the pillars were in good condition and in full compliance with contractual expectations.

47. During the reporting period, confidence-building initiatives for populations affected by the demarcation continued. Following a request by the Government of Cameroon to review the socioeconomic projects, the United Nations support team for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission undertook a mission to assess population displacements in the border areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, particularly along the northern border. Feasibility studies and cost estimates for the socioeconomic projects in Nigeria will be finalized during the last quarter of 2015.

48. In support of the implementation of measures agreed to during the summit of Heads of State on security in Nigeria, held in Paris on 17 May 2014, a concept note was developed in collaboration with the Lake Chad Basin Commission during the period under review. According to the note, the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission will provide technical support to the Lake Chad Basin Commission secretariat for the design and implementation of a rapid action plan, a socioeconomic project for women and youth and support for the rehabilitation and densification of the boundary in the Lake Chad area.

49. My Special Representative continued to engage with the parties to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission. The next meeting of the heads of delegation is expected to take place shortly. In the meantime, the United Nations support team for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission has designed a completion strategy that will serve as a road map for delivering the specific outstanding activities related to the mandate of the Commission, notably, the confidence-building projects, the pillar emplacement operations and the final mapping exercise.

B. Enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security

50. On 2 February, UNOWA and the Lake Chad Basin Commission organized a workshop on threats to peace and security in the Lake Chad Basin and cooperation between the Commission and regional United Nations entities. The workshop brought together 61 participants, including the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, as well as representatives of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria, ECOWAS, civil society and research institutes. United Nations entities, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, participated in the meeting. The discussion focused on the structure and objectives of Boko Haram and its modus operandi, the provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected population and the need for additional United Nations assistance in environmental and socioeconomic matters.

United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel

51. UNOWA, as the convener of the working group on security of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, has supported the implementation of the Strategy. The Working Group identified three main projects for implementation: (a) the UNODC capacity-building project to combat drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and corruption; (b) the provision of technical assistance by the Economic Commission for Africa to enhance small arms control, physical security and stockpile management in the Sahel; and (c) the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism project on violent extremism and radicalization in the Sahel. As of May 2015, more than 2,500 people in the Sahel have directly benefited from the UNODC capacity-building project.

Cross-border security strategy for the Mano River Union

52. The Ebola outbreak stalled activities that were to take place under the Mano River Union cross-border security strategy. However, support for national and regional responses to Ebola continued. With the assistance of UNOWA, the joint border security and confidence-building units established under the strategy supported sensitization and coordination efforts in response to the Ebola outbreak. The Mano River Union secretariat conducted media campaigns and training for the unit members and held national consultative meetings that brought together traditional leaders, youth and women's groups. The Mano River Union has also been engaged in post-Ebola recovery efforts and has held several meetings to ensure that planning for the recovery phase takes into account regional dimensions of the outbreak.

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

53. Little progress was achieved in the implementation of the decisions adopted at the Summit of Heads of State and Government on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea, held in Yaoundé in June 2013. That was because of the focus in the region on addressing the threat posed by Boko Haram, as well as the lack of

logistical and financial resources to implement the agreed road map. Since its inauguration, the Inter-regional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea has not commenced operations due to administrative obstacles and delays in onboarding staff on secondment from member States. Similarly, the regional coordination centre for maritime security in West Africa has not been established. UNOWA, in collaboration with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), is continuing its advocacy of international support to facilitate the work of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre.

54. On 13 March, UNOWA, together with UNOCA, participated in the launching of the ECOWAS Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre. From 11 to 12 May 2015, UNOWA, UNOCA and other partners in West Africa and Central Africa participated in a meeting of the Group of Seven and Friends of the Gulf of Guinea held in Pointe-Noire, Republic of the Congo. The meeting was convened to mobilize support for the implementation of the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of Central and West African States on Maritime Safety and Security in Their Common Maritime Domain, done at Yaoundé on 25 June 2013, the code of conduct and the memorandum of understanding on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Security sector reform

55. In Guinea, national efforts to reform the security sector have been hindered by the Ebola outbreak. Further to the 2014 national strategy for priority action, the United Nations assisted the national technical monitoring commission in the preparatory work for the amended 2015 budget law, including the integration of elements of the strategy in three priority areas, namely, the strengthening of security sector governance, the enhancement of operational capacities and improvement of the civil-military relationship.

56. The United Nations participated in a Joint Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau, led by the African Union from 2 to 12 March. The Mission made recommendations on the gaps and deficiencies in security sector reform and identified opportunities to assist the Government in its effort to reform security institutions in line with national priorities, the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Security Council resolution 2203 (2015).

Drug trafficking and transnational organized crime

57. The Ebola outbreak continued to slow down the activities of the transnational crime units established under the West Africa Coast Initiative in Liberia and Sierra Leone and prevented the creation of the transnational crime unit in Guinea. Notwithstanding the Ebola outbreak, the transnational crime unit in Sierra Leone has resumed its daily operations, including criminal investigations. In Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia continued to build the capacity of the transnational crime unit through the training of specialized staff. In Guinea-Bissau, the re-establishment of the transnational crime unit is being fast-tracked by national authorities, and the unit is expected to be fully operational by mid-2015. UNODC and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire have continued to support national authorities in Côte d'Ivoire in establishing a transnational crime unit, in accordance with a decree issued in November 2014.

Counter-terrorism and Boko Haram

58. In response to the rising threat posed by Boko Haram, my Special Representative participated in the ministerial meeting of the countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin in Niamey on 20 January, where the discussion focused on the operationalization of the Multinational Joint Task Force.

59. On 29 January, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 484th meeting, authorized the deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force for an initial period of 12 months, with a mandated strength of up to 7,500 military personnel. On 3 March, the troop ceiling was increased to 10,000 personnel. UNOWA participated in two meetings of experts, one held in Yaoundé from 5 to 7 February and the other in N'Djamena from 23 to 27 February, to advance the operationalization of the Multinational Joint Task Force and the development of the Task Force's strategic concept of operations. On 25 May, the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force was inaugurated in N'Djamena, on the margins of the sixteenth ordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECCAS. On 9 June, senior defence officials from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria met in Abuja to discuss, prior to the summit of Heads of State of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to be held on 11 June, the future of joint operations to combat Boko Haram.

60. On 29 January, my Special Representative for West Africa participated in the 484th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. From 13 to 18 April, my Special Representative for West Africa and my Special Representative for Central Africa undertook a diplomatic tour of countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, where they met with the Presidents of Benin, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria, the Prime Minister of Cameroon and the President-elect of Nigeria. From 23 to 25 May, the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union and my Special Representatives conducted a joint mission to countries affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, before attending the ceremony for the inauguration of the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force in N'Djamena.

C. Promotion of good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and gender mainstreaming

61. On 23 March, UNOWA organized a meeting with regional representatives of civil society organizations and networks, aimed at fostering an exchange on human rights and rule of law. A second meeting was held on 26 March, focusing on governance of natural resources and the promotion of sustainable peace in West Africa. UNOWA supported a civil society forum held in Banjul from 17 to 22 April, on the margins of the fifty-sixth ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights; representatives of about 200 organizations attended the forum, discussing challenges to human rights and the rule of law in West Africa.

62. In Dakar on 12 January, UNOWA participated in an ECOWAS meeting of experts on gender and women's affairs on the theme "Gender equality and sustainable development"; the participants assessed the impact of the ECOWAS legal framework for gender equality and women's empowerment. UNOWA also contributed to the revision of Senegal's national strategy on gender equality and equity and convened two sessions of the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security in West Africa, sharing good practices and lessons learned. In addition,

from 15 to 26 March, UNOWA, together with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Gorée Institute, participated in a joint mission to Benin and Togo to support the establishment of "women's situation rooms" as part of the efforts to ensure peaceful, non-violent and inclusive elections.

63. On 27 March, UNOWA participated in the launch of a communication network on women, peace and security at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, aimed at building support for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and related resolutions on women, peace and security. Throughout the reporting period, UNOWA continued to work with regional stakeholders and United Nations entities to finalize the evaluation of the regional plan to implement Council resolution 1325 (2000).

D. Inter-institutional cooperation

United Nations inter-institutional cooperation

64. My Special Representative for West Africa held regular meetings with the regional heads of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes based in Dakar to share information and strengthen cooperation. On 23 February, he briefed the Regional Directors' Team on political developments in the region, particularly the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the north-eastern part of Nigeria and neighbouring countries. On 10 April, my Special Representative for West Africa, my Special Representative for Central Africa and my Special Envoy for the Sahel took part in an inter-office retreat in Dakar to discuss synergies involving their three offices and identify areas to strengthen cooperation.

65. On 19 and 20 April, my Special Representative for West Africa participated in the UNDP regional consultations on peace, security and development in Central Africa and West Africa, held in Yaoundé. The participants developed a shared understanding of the regional dimensions of the Boko Haram insurgency and the crisis in the Central African Republic and identified synergies and opportunities for collaboration and coordinated efforts.

66. In Dakar on 8 May, UNOWA convened the 27th consultative meeting of Heads of United Nations Peace Missions in West Africa, which reviewed developments in the subregion, as well as progress made in the implementation of their mandates.

Cooperation with regional and subregional partners

67. Throughout the reporting period, UNOWA remained engaged with the Mano River Union with a view to finalizing the regional Ebola rehabilitation strategy. In addition, UNOWA contributed to the United Nations Ebola recovery assessment mission and supported the exchange of information with regional institutions and peace missions, focusing on the implementation of the Mano River Union cross-border security strategy. UNOWA also continued to engage with the Mano River Union secretariat in activating the resource mobilization plan adopted in Abidjan in June 2014 to enable the implementation of the strategy.

68. From 2 to 6 March, my Special Representative travelled to Brussels, London and Paris, where he held consultations with the European Union, the Commonwealth, the International Organization of la Francophonie and the secretariat of the African,

Caribbean and Pacific States on efforts to ensure peace and stability in West Africa, particularly the fight against Boko Haram and the post-Ebola rehabilitation efforts.

69. From 27 April to 3 May, UNOWA, together with ECOWAS and the African Union, conducted a joint post-election assessment of the political and security situation in Nigeria to help identify the areas and scope for future international assistance.

Observations and recommendations

70. I welcome the peaceful holding of general elections in Nigeria that has set a positive example for the region to follow. These elections have shown the determination of the Nigerian people to bring about democratic governance through a peaceful process. I salute the political leaders for putting the interest of the country before party politics, and I hope that the aspirations of the Nigerian people will be upheld and respected.

71. I remain deeply concerned about the continuing attacks by Boko Haram and its destabilizing humanitarian, human rights and security impact on the Lake Chad Basin region, particularly north-eastern Nigeria. The recent attacks by Boko Haram and its capture of Marte town in Borno State on 16 May are a reminder that the group's residual capabilities should not be underestimated. Efforts by regional and subregional actors to address this threat should continue in full compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. I welcome the recent establishment of the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force in N'Djamena, and I call on the international community to support the operationalization of the Task Force by mobilizing the requisite political, logistical and financial support and providing the necessary expertise.

72. The United Nations is committed to working closely with regional and subregional organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Lake Chad Basin Commission in order to continue strengthening regional cooperation to address cross-border security threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism and terrorism. I encourage ECOWAS and ECCAS to hold the planned summit of Heads of State to address the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in a holistic and integrated manner. UNOWA will continue to support these efforts in collaboration with relevant United Nations entities.

73. I welcome the release of hundreds of women and children from Boko Haram captivity and note that national authorities, with support from relevant United Nations entities, are providing the needed assistance. The United Nations system in Nigeria, with the support of my Special Representative for West Africa and High-level Representative to Nigeria, will continue to cooperate with relevant stakeholders in support of national stabilization efforts, particularly in the north-east of Nigeria, as outlined in the new Government's priorities. This would enable the safe and voluntary return of internally displaced persons, refugees and returnees. I reiterate the readiness of the United Nations to support the Nigerian authorities, as well as the authorities of neighbouring countries, with humanitarian assistance. In this regard, I call on Member States to contribute generously to the United Nations operations.

74. I welcome the holding of peaceful presidential elections in Togo. I urge national stakeholders to continue to engage in dialogue towards the consolidation of

democratic institutions and electoral reform. I commend the people of Benin on the peaceful conduct of parliamentary elections. In Guinea, my Special Representative will continue to support efforts to defuse tensions between the Government and the opposition and assist in creating an environment conducive to the holding of peaceful, credible and fair elections. I urge Guinean political stakeholders to engage in dialogue to address, through consensus, all contentious issues. I also call on national, regional and international partners to provide support for the successful holding of the elections.

75. The upcoming elections in Burkina Faso will need to be closely monitored, as the transition has shown recurrent signs of fragility in recent months. The role being played by the International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso is commendable; this mechanism is one of the best examples of effective regional and international preventive diplomacy.

76. The subregion continues to face serious human rights concerns, including reported violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Nigeria. I welcome the Government's commitment to addressing both the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and the more recent human rights concerns. I am concerned about attacks on civilians in Mali and Nigeria, abuses reported in the Gambia since the attempted coup in December 2014 and episodes of violence during recent demonstrations in Benin and Guinea. In the upcoming elections, the risk of political and electoral violence remains particularly high in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. I urge the Governments, the opposition parties and their supporters in those countries to exercise restraint during rallies and to refrain from using inflammatory language that may incite violence.

77. I welcome the encouraging progress achieved in the Ebola response in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and the resolute commitment of thousands of health-care workers who remained at the front lines during and in the aftermath of the outbreak. I note with concern, however, that some aspects of the national responses affected the socioeconomic situation and curtailed civil liberties. I encourage national authorities to continue the fight against the epidemic until the objective of zero Ebola cases is reached while ensuring that the fundamental human rights of its citizens are fully respected. The achievement of the objective is also crucial to the reactivation of key regional processes that have been slowed down by the impact of the epidemic. I urge donors and regional organizations to coordinate closely with United Nations entities and national authorities in support of each country's reconstruction plans.

78. Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea remains an issue of concern. I encourage States and regional and subregional organizations to remain committed to fully implementing the decisions of the Yaoundé summit. I strongly encourage West African States to work together to establish and operationalize the planned regional coordination centre for maritime security in West Africa. I also call on States in the region and partners to provide the necessary resources for the completion of the information-sharing architecture in the Gulf of Guinea. UNOWA, in collaboration with UNOCA, will continue to assist the Central and West African subregions in mobilizing resources to achieve these objectives. I also call on member States of the West Africa Coast Initiative to reinforce the existing transnational crime units, and I urge the international community to support the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations in this regard.

79. I commend the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission for its continued efforts to implement the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 and complete the demarcation exercise. I encourage the Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria to resolve the outstanding areas of disagreement for the demarcation to create conditions conducive to the swift completion of the border demarcation. My Special Representative will continue to work with both countries, towards reaching a conclusive settlement of the land boundary this year. This will enable the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission and the two parties to focus their resources and attention to support activities for cross-border development projects and final mapping.

80. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments of States in West Africa, the ECOWAS Commission, the African Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Mano River Union for their continued cooperation with the United Nations in efforts to address challenges to peace and security in the region. I also wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative for West Africa, as well as the staff of UNOWA, the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission and all United Nations entities in West Africa for their efforts to advance peace and security in the region.

United Nations S/2015/473

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 June 2015

Original: English

Letter dated 10 June 2015 from the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am pleased to provide my first report as the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission on the outcomes of the Council's seventy-ninth session, which was held in Geneva on 9 June 2015. The full text of the conclusions adopted by the Council, together with additional documentation, is attached.[1] I would, however, like to highlight a few of the issues discussed during the session.

During the opening plenary meeting, Spain was elected as the President and Malaysia was elected as a Vice-President, joining Jordan, the other Vice-President. Delegations from the Governments of Kuwait and Iraq, including a delegation from the Iraq Committee of Financial Experts, which is responsible for the oversight of the oil revenues of Iraq, addressed the Council.

With regard to the matter of the levels of income and the arrangements for ensuring that deposits are made into the Compensation Fund, it is recalled that, at a special session on 18 December 2014, the Governing Council adopted decision 272, by which it postponed the requirement that Iraq deposit 5 per cent of its oil proceeds and 5 per cent of the value of any non-monetary payments of oil and oil products made to service providers into the Compensation Fund, with deposits to resume on 1 January 2016, unless the Government of Iraq and the Council decide otherwise. The Council noted the statement by Iraq at the opening plenary meeting that it intended to seek additional relief, and the preliminary indication by Kuwait of support for the position of Iraq. Members of the Council expressed their sympathy and support to the Government and the people of Iraq, and acknowledged that the difficult economic and security situation in Iraq had continued since the postponement and might further impact the timing of the conclusion of the Commission's mandate. However, the Council emphasized that it was important that Iraq fulfil its obligations and complete payment of the outstanding compensation in a timely manner. The Council will thus invite Iraq to present a written request, which the Council will consider in the coming months.

The Governing Council noted that, since the previous session, in early October 2014, one payment of $1.06 billion had been made on 23 October 2014 to the State of Kuwait, leaving approximately $4.6 billion outstanding with respect to the

[1] Not included in the present document.

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remaining claim submitted by the Government of Kuwait on behalf of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. Further to the adoption of decision 272, deposits to the Compensation Fund ceased at the end of 2014 and approximately $960 million were deposited into the Fund between 1 October and 31 December 2014 and were returned to the Government of Iraq on 9 March 2015.

The Governing Council also heard an update from the Secretariat on ongoing audit activities pertaining to the Commission by both the United Nations Board of Auditors and the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

With the Commission nearing the conclusion of its mandate, the Governing Council discussed activities in relation to ensuring the orderly wind-down of the Commission and welcomed the progress being made by the Secretariat with respect to the archiving of the Commission's records.

With regard to the Commission's Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards, which was concluded at the end of 2013, the Governing Council noted that the second annual reports to the Council, as required in accordance with the assurances given by Jordan and Kuwait, had been received. With respect to Saudi Arabia, the Council noted that some documentation in relation to its first annual report remained outstanding and that the second annual report had yet to be submitted. Saudi Arabia will therefore be requested to honour its commitment in accordance with the assurances to provide annual reports on progress towards implementation of the projects, in the agreed format, with its environmental awards.

The Governing Council discussed the ongoing request by Iraq for a copy of the Commission's archives and noted that Iraq had not formally responded to the proposals put forward by the Council in March 2015. Iraq will therefore be invited to respond and strongly encouraged to consider the proposals favourably.

The next session of the Governing Council will be held in late October 2015.

(*Signed*) Ana María **Menéndez Pérez**
Ambassador
President of the Governing Council

United Nations S/2015/474

Security Council

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29 June 2015

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Russian Federation and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting with concern that the situation in the Middle East is tense and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) of 3 June 2015 (S/2015/405), and also reaffirming its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Stressing that both parties must abide by the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and scrupulously observe the ceasefire,

Concurring with the Secretary-General's findings that the ongoing military activities conducted by any actor in the area of separation continue to have the potential to escalate tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, jeopardize the ceasefire between the two countries, and pose a risk to the local civilian population and United Nations personnel on the ground,

Expressing grave concern at all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement,

Stressing that there should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF,

Strongly condemning the continued fighting in the area of separation, *calling* on all parties to the Syrian domestic conflict to cease military actions in the UNDOF area of operation and to respect international humanitarian law,

Condemning the use of heavy weapons by both the Syrian armed forces and armed groups in the ongoing Syrian conflict in the area of separation, including the use of tanks by the Syrian armed forces and opposition during clashes,

Echoing the Secretary-General's call upon all parties to the Syrian domestic conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operation,

Reaffirming its readiness to consider listing individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities providing support to ISIL or to the Al-Nusra Front, including those who are financing, arming, planning, or recruiting for ISIL or the Al-Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al-Qaida under

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the 1267/1989 (Al-Qaida) sanctions regime, including those participating in or otherwise supporting attacks against UN peacekeepers,

Recognizing the necessity of efforts to flexibly adjust UNDOF's posture on a temporary basis to minimize the security risk to UN personnel as UNDOF continues to implement its mandate, while emphasizing that the ultimate goal is for the peacekeepers to return to their positions in UNDOF's area of operations as soon as practicable,

Underscoring the need for UNDOF to have at its disposal all necessary means and resources to carry out its mandate safely and securely, and recalling that the theft of United Nations weapons and ammunition, vehicles and other assets, and the looting and destruction of United Nations facilities, are unacceptable,

Expressing its profound appreciation to UNDOF's military and civilian personnel, including those from Observer Group Golan, for their service and continued contribution, in an increasingly challenging operating environment, *underscoring* the important contribution UNDOF's continued presence makes to peace and security in the Middle East, *welcoming* steps taken to enhance the safety and security of UNDOF, including Observer Group Golan, personnel, and *stressing* the need for continued vigilance to ensure the safety and security of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel,

Strongly condemning the incidents threatening the safety and security of United Nations personnel in recent months, including the cases of injury of four United Nations peacekeepers as a result of the ongoing Syrian conflict.

1. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

2. *Stresses* the obligation on both parties to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, *calls on* the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation, and *underscores* that there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation, including military operations by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces;

3. *Underlines* that there should be no military activity of the armed opposition groups in the area of separation, and *urges* Member States to convey strongly to the Syrian armed opposition groups in UNDOF's area of operation to halt all activities that endanger United Nations peacekeepers on the ground and to accord the United Nations personnel on the ground the freedom to carry out their mandate safely and securely;

4. *Calls on* all groups other than UNDOF to abandon all UNDOF positions and the Quneitra crossing point, and return the peacekeepers' vehicles, weapons, and other equipment;

5. *Calls on* all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of UNDOF, to respect its privileges and immunities and to ensure its freedom of movement, as well as the security of and unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations personnel carrying out their mandate, including the unimpeded delivery of UNDOF equipment and the temporary use of alternative ports of entry and departure, as required, to ensure safe and secure troop rotation and resupply activities, in conformity with existing agreements, and *urges* prompt reporting by the Secretary-

General to the Security Council and troop-contributing countries of any actions that impede UNDOF's ability to fulfil its mandate;

6. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

7. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for a period of six months, that is, until 31 December 2015, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that UNDOF has the required capacity and resources to fulfil the mandate in a safe and secure way;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

United Nations S/2015/475

Security Council

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25 June 2015

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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

Reporting period from 28 February 2015 to 26 June 2015

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report of 28 February 2015 (S/2015/147).

2. The situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and along the Blue Line remained generally calm, despite the tense regional context and following the serious breach of the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel on 28 January (see S/2015/147). Overall, despite escalatory rhetoric on both sides, the Lebanese and Israeli authorities displayed resolve to maintain calm along the Blue Line, continued to engage constructively with UNIFIL through the established liaison and coordination arrangements and reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). There was no progress, however, on their outstanding obligations under the resolution and no movement towards a permanent ceasefire.

3. My Special Coordinator has remained closely engaged with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon, and with all Lebanese parties, in an effort to preserve the calm in Lebanon and ease political and security tensions. Fighting between Hizbullah and extremist armed groups from the Syrian Arab Republic, including the Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), in the border region of Qalamoun presents an ongoing risk for the safety of the populations living in the Beqaa, particularly the town of Arsal. The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed heavily around the town in recent weeks and clashed with extremist armed groups, including the Nusra Front and ISIL, to prevent further infiltration attempts into Lebanon. During the reporting period, there were continued incidents of shooting, shelling and air strikes from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon.

4. Despite the threat posed by insecurity along the border area between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, the security situation across most of Lebanon was relatively stable during the reporting period. Security plans for the southern Beqaa valley and southern suburbs of Beirut continue to be implemented. The security forces carried out a number of arrests of alleged militants planning terrorist attacks, including individuals suspected of belonging to the Nusra Front and ISIL.

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Negotiations to secure the safe release of Lebanese soldiers and security personnel seized by the Nusra Front and ISIL in August 2014 have continued.

5. On 25 May, Lebanon marked one year without a president of the Republic. Twenty-four parliamentary sessions to elect a new president have been inquorate owing to the continued boycott of the proceedings by members of Hizbullah and of the Free Patriotic Movement from the 8 March bloc. In the context of the presidential vacancy, on 19 May my Special Coordinator co-chaired a meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon at the invitation of Prime Minister Tammam Salam at the Grand Serail in Beirut. The Group expressed concern over the vacuum in the presidency and its negative impact on the ability of Lebanon to address the security, economic and social challenges facing the country. The Group called on all Lebanese leaders to adhere to its Constitution and to the Taif Agreement and the National Pact, to put the country's stability and national interests ahead of partisan politics and to show the necessary leadership and flexibility to urgently resolve the issue. The Group also agreed on the need for sustained, unified international support to preserve the country's stability and security.

6. Syrians fleeing the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continue to seek shelter in Lebanon. As at 4 June, there were 1,171,929 Syrian refugees registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon. In May, the Government of Lebanon asked UNHCR to suspend registration of new refugees.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

7. Ground violations of the Blue Line, mostly by shepherds and farmers, were consistent with the seasonal pattern of the corresponding period of the previous year. The Blue Line violations took place mainly in the areas of Shab'a Farms, Bastara (Sector East) and Rumaysh (Sector West). Most ground violations were brief, but on occasion shepherds with their flocks and farmers stayed south of the Blue Line for several hours, despite calls by UNIFIL to return north of the Blue Line.

8. The most serious ground violation of the Blue Line occurred on 10 March, when six men in civilian attire, later identified as part of the Lebanese Armed Forces intelligence branch, crossed south of the Blue Line, south of Kafer Chouba (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces fired several warning shots before the men returned north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL conducted an investigation into the incident and shared its findings and recommendations with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces on 17 April.

9. On 9 June, a small group of civilians, including a member of the Lebanese Parliament and journalists, held a peaceful demonstration at the Blue Line to protest recent construction works by the Israel Defense Forces on a patrol track and the placement of concertina wire south of the Blue Line in the Shab'a Farms area. Several demonstrators briefly crossed south of the Blue Line and hoisted a Lebanese flag on the wire located approximately seven metres south of the Blue Line, despite

calls by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces for the protestors to remain north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL used its good offices to impress upon the parties the need to ensure that there was no rise in tension or escalation and prevent any destabilizing activity.

10. Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace continued almost daily with unmanned aerial vehicles, and often with fixed-wing aircraft, including fighter jets. UNIFIL also observed a number of Israeli overflights using helicopters. The Lebanese Government protested the violations. UNIFIL protested the overflights and urged the Israeli authorities to halt those violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

11. Israel also continued to occupy northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. Further to my earlier reports, Israel has not responded to the proposal by UNIFIL, submitted to both parties in 2011, concerning security arrangements aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces conveyed in July 2011 its approval of the proposal. UNIFIL has renewed its efforts to facilitate the secure use by Lebanese civilians of the road lying north of the occupied area.

12. The latter part of the reporting period has been characterized by escalatory rhetoric involving claims by both Hizbullah and Israel of their preparedness for any possible resumption of hostilities across the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces continued to allege that Hizbullah was maintaining military infrastructure and equipment inside populated areas in southern Lebanon and that unauthorized weapons were being transferred into the UNIFIL area of operations. In a letter dated 27 May addressed to me (S/2015/382), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that Hizbullah was using "dozens of villages in southern Lebanon as military staging grounds, civilian centres as weapons depots and its people as human shields". The letter referred to media reports as revealing of Hizbullah's "varied efforts to bypass" resolution 1701 (2006), asserting that "the threats are very real and the danger is imminent". The letter further stated that Israel would hold the Government of Lebanon responsible for any attack originating from its territory and reserved the right to take all necessary measures in self-defence. In a letter dated 10 June addressed to me (S/2015/428), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon recalled complaints of Lebanon about Israeli "standing contravention" and "ongoing violations" of resolution 1701 (2006) and Lebanese sovereignty. The letter further complained that Israeli officials had made "serious threats" on the Lebanese Government, had sought to "intimidate its people" and had spread allegations "in order to justify what they call the inevitable future war".

13. In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL does not proactively search for weapons in the south. UNIFIL cannot enter or search private property unless there is credible evidence of a violation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity from that location. In situations in which specific information is received regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel, weapons or infrastructure inside its area of operations, UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, remains determined to act with all means available within its mandate and capabilities. To date, UNIFIL has neither been provided with, nor found, evidence of the unauthorized transfer of arms into its area of operations.

14. UNIFIL observed civilians with unauthorized weapons in the area of operations, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). Those mostly involved

individuals carrying hunting weapons. However, there were a number of instances where small arms, including rifles and, at least on one occasion, rocket-propelled grenades, were fired during commemorative events, including funerals. In two such instances, a falling bullet penetrated the roof of the living quarters within a UNIFIL base, causing no injury to personnel. In addition, on 18 March, five men were observed carrying assault rifles at a funeral in the vicinity of Jwayyaa (Sector West). On 25 March, in Srifa (Sector West), UNIFIL observed four men carrying assault rifles. On 26 May, UNIFIL observed two men in separate funeral convoys in Tibnin and Yazire (Sector West) carrying weapons and firing in the air. On 2 June, UNIFIL saw one man with an assault rifle near Marjayoun (Sector East). In all cases, UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces of the violations. The Lebanese Armed Forces has primary responsibility for ensuring that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River is free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons, other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL.

15. UNIFIL continued generally to enjoy full freedom of movement throughout its area of operations, despite three notable incidents. On 7 April, in the vicinity of Majda Zun (Sector West) a group of civilians threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol and one of its vehicles was rammed by another vehicle. On proceeding further, the patrol was blocked in the neighbouring village of Shihin (Sector West) and the UNIFIL personnel were threatened by a larger crowd. The obstruction was cleared after discussions with the local population with the assistance of the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL strongly protested the incident to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In addition, UNIFIL freedom of movement was obstructed in one instance when a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was denied access to a road close to At Tiri by a group of civilians on 5 April. The Lebanese Armed Forces intervened and the UNIFIL patrol was able to proceed.

16. In a case of unfriendly behaviour on 16 April, a civilian approached UNIFIL military police personnel who were conducting speed checks in the vicinity of Rumaysh, photographed them and demanded their speed detector. The UNIFIL personnel refused to hand over the equipment.

17. On 18 March in the vicinity of Rumaysh, an Israel Defense Forces tank pointed its main weapon across the Blue Line and tracked a foot patrol of Observer Group Lebanon moving approximately 60 metres away. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

18. UNIFIL relations with the local population remained largely positive as the Mission sought to deepen its cooperation with the communities present in the area of operations. UNIFIL, including the Head of Mission and Force Commander, maintained intensive engagement with local authorities, religious leaders and civil society representatives to promote better understanding of the Mission's mandate and activities. In accordance with the strategic priorities of UNIFIL (see S/2012/151), UNIFIL collaborated with the United Nations Development Programme in organizing training for 50 municipal police officials to further good governance in southern Lebanon. A tree-planting campaign, in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment, was aimed at reducing the Mission's environmental footprint. UNIFIL also participated in the "Greening the South" campaign, whereby thousands of trees were planted across the area of operations. In addition to no-cost initiatives, work on implementing quick-impact projects continued, and UNIFIL

contingents provided veterinary, medical and dental assistance to the local communities.

19. UNIFIL conducted on average 11,000 operational activities monthly, including patrols, checkpoints and observation tasks. Approximately 10 per cent of UNIFIL activities were carried out in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River remained generally at the same level of approximately two brigades. UNIFIL conducted 166 joint exercises, workshops and courses with the Lebanese Armed Forces, with the aim of improving the tactical and operational capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The joint training efforts further developed the coordination between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces and enhanced the effectiveness of combined operations at operational and tactical levels.

20. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, in accordance with its mandate, carried out maritime interdiction activities and provided training for the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy. During the reporting period, the Maritime Task Force hailed 1,745 ships and the Lebanese authorities inspected 363 vessels to ensure that no unauthorized weapons or related materiel were transferred into Lebanon. In a continued effort to strengthen the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force conducted a total of 313 trainings and exercises for the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy.

21. The maritime border between Israel and Lebanon is disputed, and incidents in the area occurred that had the potential to increase tensions. During the reporting period, UNIFIL maintained a visible presence in the southern part of its area of maritime operations. UNIFIL has no mandate to monitor the line of buoys, which was unilaterally installed by Israel and is not recognized by the Government of Lebanon. During the reporting period, the Israel Defense Forces carried out frequent maintenance activity at the line of buoys, continuing at times for days. On several occasions, Israel Defense Forces patrol boats, positioned south of the line of buoys, fired machine gun rounds and flares in a westerly direction.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

22. UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements with the parties remain the key mechanism to defuse tensions on the ground and to address issues of mutual concern in order to safeguard the cessation of hostilities, ensure respect for the Blue Line and promote security and stability in southern Lebanon. The parties continue to engage with UNIFIL on all levels in a constructive and positive manner to help reduce tensions. UNIFIL urged the parties to further utilize the liaison and coordination mechanism by providing prior intimation through UNIFIL of any planned activities close to the Blue Line in order to avoid any related misunderstandings or apprehensions. There has been no progress towards the establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv.

23. Palestinian commemorations of Land Day, Al-Nakba and An-Naksa took place peacefully on 30 March, 15 May and 5 June after close liaison by UNIFIL with the parties, bilaterally and through the tripartite mechanism, and as the Lebanese authorities continued to exercise control on access and public gatherings near the Blue Line on those occasions.

24. The tripartite forum continues to be convened regularly by UNIFIL with the participation of representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, serving as the Mission's main liaison and coordination tool for addressing all security and military operational issues relating to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). There have been two tripartite meetings, on 18 March and 11 May, since my previous report.

25. The first meeting included a review of the outcomes of the UNIFIL investigations into the 28 January incident, which was transmitted on 17 April to the Israel Defense Forces and to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The UNIFIL investigations reconfirmed the preliminary facts of the incident as set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 of my previous report. In the tripartite meeting, UNIFIL reiterated to the parties its recommendations aimed at, inter alia, preventing any further hostile activity from the UNIFIL area of operations, preserving the integrity of the Blue Line, taking further steps to ensure that no illicit arms are present in the area of operations and protecting the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel.

26. Other areas of focus at the tripartite meetings included ground violations of the Blue Line, Israeli air violations and the lack of progress on the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from northern Ghajar. Israeli allegations of Hizbullah activities near the Blue Line remained a contentious point of discussion between the parties. Both parties expressed renewed interest in engaging bilaterally with UNIFIL to find practical localized solutions to the seasonal violations of the Blue Line.

27. Progress in the visible marking of the Blue Line continued. As at 12 June, the parties had agreed to mark 313 out of a total of 527 Blue Line points. Of the 313 agreed points, UNIFIL demining teams have cleared access to 312 points, 249 of which have been measured. Some 231 Blue Line markers have been constructed and 216 have been verified by both parties.

28. In line with the strategic priorities of UNIFIL to increase the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL continued to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in the implementation of the strategic dialogue plan, which is an integral part of the Lebanese Armed Forces' capabilities development plan and complements the efforts of the International Support Group for Lebanon to bolster the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The strategic dialogue steering committee, including representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL, met on 28 April to update a list of the imminent needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces for tasks mandated under resolution 1701 (2006) in the area of operations, to be presented to international donors. The strategic dialogue subcommittee on training decided to adopt the "training of trainers" approach to enhance the sustainability of the joint training activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

C. Disarming armed groups

29. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the Lebanese State, in violation of resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006), continues to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. During the reporting period, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged again publicly that Hizbullah has a substantial and sophisticated military capacity, separate from that of the Lebanese State, which Hizbullah claims serves as a deterrent against potential aggression

from Israel. Recent media reports have quoted Hizbullah sources purporting to show the presence of military capabilities held by Hizbullah in southern Lebanon and Hizbullah's readiness to use such capabilities. There have been no meetings of the National Dialogue during the reporting period and no other formal discussion of Hizbullah's arms among Lebanese parties.

30. Security forces reported several successful operations to prevent terrorist activities and arrest alleged terrorists. Lebanese and Syrian nationals reportedly belonging to a number of organizations, including the Nusra Front and ISIL, were arrested in towns across Lebanon. On 20 May, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device was discovered and disarmed close to a Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoint in Arsal.

31. Negotiations have continued for the release of the 26 hostages held by the Nusra Front and ISIL, amidst concerns that some of the hostages held by ISIL may have been moved to Raqqa in the Syrian Arab Republic. During the reporting period, two Lebanese nationals and a Syrian national were arrested on suspicion of having played a role in the abduction of the hostages.

32. There has been no progress on the dismantling of military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada. In 2006, it was decided in the National Dialogue that the bases should be dismantled. The existence of the bases continues to compromise Lebanese sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to monitor and control effectively parts of the Lebanese-Syrian border.

33. The situation in the Palestinian camp of Ein el-Helweh has been tense during the reporting period following the murder of a Lebanese national affiliated with the "Hizbullah Resistance Brigades" on 5 April and a series of other assassination attempts. The Joint Security Force continues its efforts to maintain stability in the camp and has now expanded its deployment to additional areas inside the camp.

D. Arms embargo and border control

34. In its resolution 1701 (2006), the Security Council decided that all States should prevent the sale or the supply of arms and related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft. In the same resolution, the Council also called upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points so as to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms and related materiel.

35. Representatives of the Government of Israel have consistently alleged that there are significant ongoing arms transfers to Hizbullah across the Lebanese-Syrian border, and that Hizbullah has now amassed an arsenal of over 100,000 missiles and rockets, much of which Israel claims is located in civilian residential areas. In a speech on 24 May, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah stated that Hizbullah possesses the highest military capability since the organization was created and, in the event of an attack by Israel, it is prepared to use its capabilities to respond from both Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations takes the allegations seriously but is not currently in a position to verify them independently.

36. Fighting in the Qalamoun region of the Syrian Arab Republic continued during the reporting period, as did reports of the movement of fighters and arms trafficking across the border between the two countries. Hizbullah has openly acknowledged its engagement in the Qalamoun region and in fighting against the Nusra Front in the un-delineated border area between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, including near the Lebanese towns of Arsal, Brital and Tufayl. A number of funerals for Hizbullah fighters killed in the Syrian Arab Republic were held during the reporting period. There have also been reports of the deaths of Lebanese citizens, including members of the Nusra Front and ISIL, in fighting in the Syrian conflict.

37. During the reporting period, there was an increase in cross-border fire from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon. There were 87 incidents of shooting, 10 incidents of shelling and 10 rockets fired into Lebanon, and at least 22 airstrikes by Syrian Government aircraft on Lebanese territory.

38. The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed along the eastern Lebanese-Syrian border to defend the civilian population living in those areas against infiltration attempts by Syrian armed opposition groups and extremist elements from the Nusra Front and ISIL. On 16 March and 2 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces clashed with armed elements at Wadi Hmeid and prevented them from entering the town of Arsal. On 7 April, Lebanese army units seized a position controlled by the Nusra Front at al Mukhairmeh on the outskirts of Ras Baalbek, where there were further clashes on 16 April. The Lebanese Armed Forces have shelled areas around Arsal to prevent positions from being established around the town. On 4 June the Cabinet authorized the Lebanese Armed Forces to take the measures necessary to defend the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

39. During the reporting period, international support was provided to the Lebanese Armed Forces to enhance its capability to protect Lebanon from terrorist threats and to secure the border with the Syrian Arab Republic. On 20 April, the first shipment of French arms under the $3 billion grant from Saudi Arabia arrived in Lebanon, and other bilateral partners have also provided military equipment and training.

40. While the number of registered refugees remains at approximately the same level as in my previous report, refugees are spread over 1,170 communities across the country, including 55,833 in the UNIFIL area of operations. There are a further 18,849 non-Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon, predominantly from Iraq. There is ongoing implementation of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and 100 partners are now operating across 55 per cent of Lebanese territory. Some 21,000 Lebanese returnees from the Syrian Arab Republic have also been registered by the International Organization for Migration but estimates suggest that around 50,000 nationals have returned to Lebanon.

41. New entry and residency rules for Syrian nationals since January 2015 restrict admission to Lebanon to all but exceptional humanitarian circumstances. UNHCR was requested by the Government of Lebanon on 5 May 2015 to temporarily suspend new registrations of refugees and to deregister 2,626 refugees from the UNHCR registration database that had been registered since 5 January 2015. UNHCR is presently leading discussions with the Ministry of Social Affairs on future modalities to assist registered Syrian refugees.

42. Conditions for refugees in Lebanon are deteriorating. Refugees remain at risk of eviction from their dwellings and face increased challenges in residing legally in Lebanon, making them increasingly vulnerable to arrest and other forms of abuse. Women and children constitute 80 per cent of the refugee population. There continue to be reports of early and forced marriage, and survival sex, particularly among refugee women and girls. Two thirds of the 53,000 children born to Syrian refugee parents since March 2011 do not have a birth certificate.

43. Over the course of the past five months, funding shortfalls have reduced food assistance to Syrian refugees by 60 per cent and over 103,000 Syrians no longer receive cash assistance. Over 300,000 refugee children remain without access to any education programmes. On 16 April, the Ministry of Education committed to doubling enrolment rates by increasing enrolment of 200,000 children in formal education and facilitating the admission of a further 100,000 refugee children in accelerated learning programmes, contingent upon international financing.

44. Very few individual Palestine refugees have entered Lebanon from the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period following the restrictions imposed on their entry by the Government of Lebanon in May 2014. The total number of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic in Lebanon remains stable at 45,150 registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Those refugees continue to face restrictions on renewing their legal status in Lebanon. On 22 May, cuts to assistance were announced for the Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, who will have their $100 cash assistance for shelter suspended in July 2015. An estimated 3,000 Palestinian refugee children are currently out of school.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

45. Five manual mine clearance teams, one explosives ordnance disposal team and one mechanical mine clearance team from UNIFIL troop-contributing countries were validated and deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations. UNIFIL cleared more than 468 square metres of contaminated land to provide access to Blue Line points during the period from 28 February 2015 to 10 June 2015. In addition, 15 anti-personnel mines were located and destroyed. Furthermore, the United Nations Mine Action Service team conducted 12 validation events, 26 quality assurance visits to operational or completed sites, 6 training support events and 113 coordination meetings, briefings and demonstrations.

46. During the reporting period, three incidents related to explosive remnants of war and landmines occurred in the UNIFIL area of operations. An explosion on 27 March, near Zibqin (Sector West), that was apparently caused by a cluster munition, resulted in the death of one child and injured four other children. On 14 April, near Blida (Sector East), a civilian who walked into a marked minefield lost his leg upon activating an anti-personnel mine. On 26 May, in Maroun ar Ras (Sector West), a civilian truck using a local road was damaged by an anti-personnel mine.

F. Delineation of borders

47. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border during the reporting period, including in areas where it is uncertain or disputed, as called for in Security Council resolutions 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). Extending the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout all Lebanese territory and enabling the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces to secure borders to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel necessitates the delineation and demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic as soon as practicable.

48. There has also been no progress on the issue of the Shab'a Farms. In a letter dated 16 March addressed to me (S/2015/184), the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that the delineation of borders in the Shab'a Farms area should take place after the Israeli occupation of that area has come to an end in accordance with relevant resolutions. There has still been no reaction to the provisional definition of that area contained in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641) from either Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

49. UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plans and risk mitigation measures and closely coordinated them with the Lebanese authorities. Force protection works to upgrade installations and assets are ongoing. Stringent security measures remain in force in a part of Sector East of the UNIFIL area of operations.

50. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings at the Lebanese Military Court against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL. In the case of a serious attack against Spanish peacekeepers in 2007, the investigation against an arrested suspect has been concluded. In the case of a serious attack perpetrated in 2008, a hearing at the Military Court of Appeal was conducted on 17 March 2015, and the next hearing is scheduled to take place on 1 October 2015. In three cases of serious attacks perpetrated in 2011, the investigation is ongoing. In a case of terror intent opened in January 2014, a hearing at the Permanent Military Court is scheduled to take place on 10 July 2015. With a view to enhancing the Mission's cooperation with the highest judicial authorities, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander met with the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Prosecutor General and officials from the Military Court on 22 May.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

51. As at 31 May 2015, UNIFIL consisted of 10,463 military personnel from 39 troop-contributing countries, including 398 women, as well as 272 international and 600 national civilian staff, including 82 and 150 women, respectively. In addition, 52 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, including 4 women, are also part of UNIFIL. UNIFIL is working to

increase the number of civilian and military women deployed, with a view to reducing the gender imbalance in the Mission.

V. Observations

52. I welcome the current calm and stability in the UNIFIL area of operations and along the Blue Line, particularly as it follows the serious breach of the cessation of hostilities that took place on 28 January. I am concerned, however, by the escalatory media and public statements from Israel and Hizbullah, which contribute to a climate of tension. Renewed armed conflict is not inevitable. Both the Israeli and Lebanese Governments have a responsibility, and indeed an obligation, to promote stability, take all possible steps to prevent any risk of incident that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities and make good on their commitment to implement fully resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions. I therefore renew my call on all concerned to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric and threats of the use of force that heighten the risk of escalation and miscalculation. I take this opportunity to recall the consequences of the 2006 conflict and the even more dangerous scale of any renewed confrontation and to remind all parties of their obligations under international humanitarian law.

53. The Security Council has repeatedly called upon both Israel and Lebanon to take concrete steps towards a permanent ceasefire and the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). In an increasingly volatile regional environment, and in the light of the heightened risks of miscalculation, meaningful progress towards the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) is more important than ever. Building on the confidence that has been established through the work of my Special Coordinator and UNIFIL, I call on both parties to make a renewed, concerted effort towards resolving the outstanding provisions of the resolution. I stand ready to assist the parties in that regard. I also urge the parties to continue actively participating in UNIFIL conflict-prevention and confidence-building initiatives in order to keep southern Lebanon and the Blue Line stable. There are steps that the parties could take to build confidence and I ask them to seize the moment to find agreement on practical localized arrangements that would mitigate the risk for tension and incidents along the Blue Line.

54. I regret that there has been no progress on the Shab'a Farms area in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). Recent developments on the ground have shown the potential for destabilization that comes from not addressing that issue and underscore the need for constructive progress rather than further delays. I reiterate my call on the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area that I provided in my report of 30 October 2007, and I encourage the parties to work with my Special Coordinator and with UNIFIL to achieve resolution of the issue.

55. The occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces is a continuing violation of resolution 1701 (2006). Israel has an obligation to withdraw its armed forces from the area, in accordance with the resolution. I urge the Israeli authorities to take steps to that end and encourage them to make further use of the presence of UNIFIL and its liaison and coordination apparatus to facilitate a smooth and secure withdrawal from the area.

56. It remains a matter of serious concern that Israel continues to violate Lebanese airspace on an almost daily basis, in complete disregard of the sovereignty of Lebanon and the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006). I once again call on the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory and territorial waters.

57. I also remind the Lebanese authorities of their primary responsibility to ensure that the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line is free of unauthorized weapons. Recent incidents involving the use of assault weapons, small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, and the missile attack on 28 January by Hizbullah on an Israeli military convoy across the Blue Line, demonstrate that unauthorized weapons are still present in the area. Those incidents, coupled with Hizbullah's self-declared capabilities in the south, are of grave concern. I once again call on the Lebanese authorities to ensure that there are no unauthorized weapons in the UNIFIL area of operations, in accordance with resolution 1701 (2006).

58. There continues to be progress on the visible marking of the Blue Line owing to the commitment from both the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces. I encourage the parties to continue working on finding points of agreement through constructive engagement with UNIFIL, including in relation to those stretches of the Blue Line where marking is deemed contentious by the parties. The visible marking of the Blue Line enhances the monitoring of violations and greatly contributes to its integrity. I also remind all parties that full respect for the Blue Line is a critical factor in maintaining stability and calm in the area and that any deliberate violation of the Blue Line is unacceptable.

59. I am deeply concerned that the vacuum in the presidency of the country continues to seriously undermine the ability of Lebanon to address the security, economic and social challenges facing the country. I commend Prime Minister Salam's leadership in upholding the unity of Government and call on all parties to work constructively to enable the Government to function effectively. I call on all Lebanese leaders to adhere to its Constitution and to the Taif Agreement and National Pact, to put aside partisan politics by placing the country's stability and national interests first and to show the necessary leadership and flexibility to elect a president. The presidency is and must remain a Lebanese process, free from foreign interference. At the same time, it is crucial that international support for Lebanon is paralleled by meaningful action by the country's political leaders. The continued boycott of parliamentary sessions by members of Parliament undermines the country's democratic tradition. Members of Parliament should fulfil their obligation and convene to elect a president without further delay.

60. I remain deeply concerned by the threat posed by violent extremist groups to the Lebanese population living in eastern areas bordering the Syrian Arab Republic. I highly commend the strong and determined role of the Lebanese Armed Forces in protecting the country's border areas and defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for upholding its independence as the sole legitimate State institution in that regard. I also reiterate my call on those holding Lebanese soldiers and security service personnel hostage to release them immediately. I urge all Lebanese political leaders to remain united in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and to avoid creating further vacuums in senior military and security positions at this crucial time for the country's security and stability.

61. I welcome the ongoing international support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces to strengthen their capability to address the multiple security challenges Lebanon faces. I note that it advances a key component of work of the International Support Group for Lebanon. In that regard, I welcome the arrival of the first shipment of French support to the Lebanese Armed Forces under the generous grant from Saudi Arabia, as well as continuing bilateral assistance from the United States of America and others. I encourage bilateral partners and donors to continue their support where the Lebanese Armed Forces is most critically in need in order to give it the necessary operational advantage to effectively address security threats, including for counter-terrorism and the further capability to deploy along the country's borders, as well as in the context of the strategic dialogue plan as an integral part of the Lebanese Armed Forces' capabilities development plan.

62. I condemn the shelling, shooting and aerial incursions into Lebanese border areas from the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the movement of armed fighters and war materiel between the countries. The lack of a delineated, demarcated border between the two countries is no justification for the continued violations of the sovereignty of Lebanon. I call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and groups fighting in the Qalamoun and other areas bordering Lebanon to cease such violations and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

63. I condemn the participation of Lebanese citizens in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in breach of the policy of disassociation adopted by the Government of Lebanon and of the principles in the Baabda Declaration, which had been agreed by all of the country's political parties in June 2012 and the importance of which has been reaffirmed by the Security Council. I call on all Lebanese parties to step back from any involvement in the Syrian conflict, consistent with their commitments in that regard.

64. I am increasingly concerned at rising radicalization in the region and the threat it poses to Lebanon. I welcome dialogue between Lebanese parties aimed at easing tensions between and within communities and encourage the country's leaders to proactively advocate for moderation and compromise during this difficult period. In a context of polarization, the proliferation of arms outside of the authority of the Lebanese State is a serious threat to stability and security. I call on Member States to uphold their obligation under resolution 1701 (2006) to prevent the sale or supply of arms or related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon.

65. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the State continues to pose a threat to Lebanese sovereignty and stability, and contradicts the country's obligations under resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). Lebanon cannot afford the serious unforeseen consequences of the use of those arms should they provoke conflict. It is vital that once a new president is elected the National Dialogue meet again as a matter of priority to address issues of national importance, including the arms held by Hizbullah and other groups. It remains important that earlier decisions of the National Dialogue be implemented, specifically those relating to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

66. The need to support the Lebanese judicial and security authorities is clear, and I urge them to continue their efforts to combat impunity. In that regard, I note the decision of 13 May sentencing former Minister Michel Samaha to prison for his part

in a plot to foment sectarian violence in Lebanon. I also call on all parties to cooperate fully with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The continuing trial sends a message that impunity will not be tolerated.

67. I thank the Member States participating in the International Support Group for Lebanon for their continued commitment and welcome the Group's statement following the meeting convened on 19 May by Prime Minister Salam at the Grand Serail and co-chaired by my Special Coordinator. With the continued united support of the Security Council as expressed in its presidential statement of 19 March 2015 (S/PRST/2015/7), the Group remains an important forum to ensure strong, coordinated support for Lebanese resilience and generate momentum for the assistance urgently needed to preserve stability and security in the country. That support is particularly important to maintain given the increasing pressures on Lebanon and the growing threats from regional developments. I encourage the Group to continue to look for opportunities to meet at the appropriate level to engage on its support agenda.

68. Five years into the Syrian crisis, I acknowledge the continued efforts by Lebanon to host and assist refugees. I take note of the Government's latest decisions and urge the Lebanese authorities to continue working closely with the United Nations, especially UNHCR, and partners, including the upholding of human rights and humanitarian principles. On 31 March, I attended the Third International Pledging Conference for Syria, held in Kuwait City, where international donors pledged $3.8 billion to address the humanitarian needs caused by the Syrian conflict. Given the scale of the refugee crisis in Lebanon and the potentially serious implications for the country's future stability, I reiterate my call on donors to respond generously and as a matter of urgency to aid the country's ability to manage its refugee crisis. As at 26 May, only 21 per cent of the $2.1 billion in funding requirements for the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan had been met.

69. I welcome the continued commitment of the Palestinian leadership to disassociate the Palestinian camps in Lebanon from the violence in the region. The need to improve the living conditions of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, without prejudice to the resolution of the refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement, is ever more urgent. Palestine refugees displaced in Lebanon from the Syrian Arab Republic are becoming increasingly vulnerable. I encourage donors to be forthcoming in their support of UNRWA to enable it to effectively assist them.

70. For both Lebanon and Israel, exploration and development of their respective offshore oil and gas resources are national priorities. During the reporting period, both countries indicated their wish to resolve the dispute over the maritime exclusive economic zone, though no progress was made in that regard. I again encourage both Lebanon and Israel to proceed with steps that would allow for resolution of that issue and reiterate that the United Nations stands ready to assist if both parties so request.

71. The challenges to the stability and security of Lebanon have become more complex, including as a result of the situation in the region. The United Nations is working as one in Lebanon with Lebanese and international partners to address multiple challenges to peace and security, on stabilization and on the provision of vital humanitarian and developmental support, with a strong and tangible commitment to human rights. Particular emphasis is also placed on the needs of vulnerable Lebanese host communities. I encourage all stakeholders to work with

my Special Coordinator and UNIFIL to achieve those goals through such a holistic approach aimed at the whole of Lebanon. Progress on the implementation of outstanding relevant Security Council resolutions will be central to longer-term solutions to end conflict in the region, and to a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

72. I extend my sincere appreciation to all Member States contributing troops and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. I thank my Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, and the personnel of their respective missions, all of whom continue to play a critical role in helping to promote stability along the Blue Line and in Lebanon at a critical time for the country and for the region.

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Letter dated 25 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 25 June 2015 from the representative of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Raimonda **Murmokaitė**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-10521 (E) 300615

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Annex to the letter dated 25 June 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, it is with grave concern and growing outrage that I draw your attention to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria and the worsening violence perpetrated by Syrian regime forces, including through the systematic and illegal use of indiscriminate aerial weapons.

Three years after the signing of the Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué, the crisis in Syria is no closer to a resolution. Assad's forces continue to kill, maim and rape civilians with impunity, and the savagery, depravity and scale of their atrocities only continue to grow. As a result, May was the deadliest month yet in the Syrian conflict, accounting for the deaths of close to 7,000 people, more than 1,200 of whom were civilians.

Three hundred civilians are now killed each week in Syria. The overwhelming majority of these deaths are caused by the Syrian regime's indiscriminate aerial bombardment. Regime helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft accounted for two thirds of all civilian deaths in May and June 2015, according to the Violations Documentation Centre in Syria.

Aleppo governorate has been particularly hard hit by the Syrian regime's indiscriminate aerial assaults. In May alone, more than 200 civilians were killed by regime aircraft across Aleppo. Among the most horrific air attacks launched by Syrian regime forces in Aleppo was a lethal barrel-bomb attack conducted on 3 May that targeted the Seif al-Dawla teaching centre. As students were sitting their final exams, regime helicopters pounded the teaching centre with explosive barrel bombs. These attacks resulted in seven deaths, including those of four children and a teacher. An even more lethal aerial attack took place just four weeks later. On 30 May, the regime again struck Aleppo's residential marketplace in the town of Al-Bab with barrel bombs, killing more than 70 civilians and injuring dozens more. Just this past week, on 22 June, Syrian regime barrel bombs struck a mosque in Aleppo, killing 10 worshippers as they observed Ramadan.

In addition to Aleppo, regime air forces have targeted Idlib, rural Damascus, eastern Ghouta, Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra/Tadmur, often, albeit not exclusively, using barrel bombs. These indiscriminate barrel-bomb attacks have been systematic and repeated and wilfully designed to maximize civilian casualties and spread fear among innocent men, women and children. As the Chair of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic stated in Geneva on 12 March 2015, "the timing and duration of the attacks demonstrate that the aim of the Government's campaign of barrel-bombing was to terrorize the civilian population present in the areas attacked, with the clear message that no civilian was safe anywhere at any time of the day or night".

Assad's systematic use of barrel bombs violates international humanitarian law and constitutes the war crime of targeting civilians, which is prohibited under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and by Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2209 (2015), as well as 2139 (2014), which stipulates that "all parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate employment of

weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs ..."

Barrel bombs are by far the most lethal form of the Syrian regime's attacks on civilians. They are not, however, the only form of lethal attack perpetrated by Syrian regime forces. Assad's troops continue to besiege, detain, torture and kill Syrian civilians with impunity, while systematically obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid to hundreds of thousands of civilians across the country (see enclosure). These crimes can and must be stopped.

The atrocities in Syria are untenable. After more tha.. 220,000 deaths, half the population displaced and an equal number in desperate need of aid, it is imperative that the Security Council take action to stop the killing in Syria. On behalf of my fellow countrymen and women, I therefore ask that the Council act with urgency to stop the barrel-bomb attacks in Syria, including by authorizing the only instrument capable of stopping Assad's helicopters from launching their brutal aerial attacks: a no-fly zone.

A no-fly zone would stop the leading killer of Syrian civilians, Assad's barrel bombs, by ensuring that all helicopters were grounded. It would enable humanitarian aid to reach more parts of Syria with greater frequency. It would deprive the Syrian regime of the primary delivery mechanism used to deploy chlorine gas against innocent civilians. And it would create the conditions needed to compel the Syrian regime to engage in viable negotiations.

In his sixteenth report on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) (S/2015/468), the Secretary-General called on the Security Council "to take urgent action" to stop the atrocities in Syria. "Lack of action", he warned, "will throw the country deeper into chaos and deprive the country of a peaceful and prosperous future".

It is vital that members of the Security Council heed the Secretary-General's warning. By imposing a no-fly zone, Member States would alleviate my people's suffering. They would stop Assad's use of chemical weapons. Most importantly, they would save the lives of civilians. Member States have the capacity to impose a no-fly zone safely and without fear of military escalation. On behalf of my people, I appeal to you to find the moral and political courage needed to impose a no-fly zone and abandon the tragic course of inaction, which has cost so many lives in my country.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative to the United Nations
National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces

Enclosure

Syrian regime non-compliance with Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014), May-June 2015

Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law

1. The Syrian regime continued to violate human rights and international humanitarian law throughout the reporting period, including by killing and maiming civilians, attacking schools and hospitals, engaging in arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and the ill treatment of women and children. As a result of these violations, May was the deadliest month yet in the Syrian conflict, accounting for the deaths of 6,657 people, of which at least 1,285 were civilians, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Attacks against civilians and indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas

2. By far the greatest killer of Syrian civilians throughout the reporting period was indiscriminate aerial bombardment. According to the Violations Documentation Centre in Syria, no less than two thirds (66 per cent) of all civilian deaths during the month of May were caused by indiscriminate aerial bombardment. That proportion looks to be on par with the statistics of June 2015: as of 23 June, over 60 per cent of all civilian deaths were attributable to indiscriminate aerial bombardment.

3. Once again, barrel bombs were the primary delivery mechanism used to deploy chemical weapons against innocent civilians throughout the reporting period. Table 1 provides a summary of the chemical weapons attacks perpetrated by Syrian regime forces since 1 May 2015, as monitored by the Syrian Civil Defence teams.

Table 1
Chemical weapons attacks, May-June 2015

Date	*Description of attack*	*Location*	*Casualties*
1 May	1 chlorine barrel bomb dropped by regime	Al Nayyrab	12 injured
2 May	2 chlorine barrel bombs dropped by regime	Saraqeb	100 injured
3 May	4 chlorine barrel bombs dropped by regime	Eblin Kinsafra (Jabal al Zawieyah) Jozef (Jabal al Zawieyah) Jobar	34+ injured
7 May	3 chlorine barrel bombs dropped by regime	Kafar Battiekh Al Janoudiah	175+ injured
15 May	2 chlorine barrel bombs dropped by regime	Mishimshan Ain Alsawda	2 deaths, 22 injured
16 May	1 chlorine barrel bomb dropped by regime	Mishimshan	10 injured
17 May	2 chlorine barrel bombs dropped by regime	Mishimshan Kastan	40 injured

Date	*Description of attack*	*Location*	*Casualties*
19 May	3 chlorine barrel bombs dropped by regime	Bashieriah Mishimshan Al Shougr	40+ injured
7 June	3 chlorine barrel bombs dropped by regime	Saraqeb Kensafra	no injuries
9 June	2 chlorine barrel bombs dropped by regime	Bashieriah	unknown

Attacks against medical facilities and schools

4. May was the worst month yet for attacks on medical facilities in Syria, with 15 attacks on 14 medical facilities and 10 medical personnel killed. According to Physicians for Human Rights, Syrian regime forces were responsible for all of the attacks in May. Eight of the attacks were perpetrated via barrel bombs launched from Syrian regime helicopters, while seven attacks were conducted with rockets and missiles. As of January 2015, no less than 95 per cent of the Syrian regime's attacks on medical facilities and medical personnel were conducted through fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft. Among the medical facilities and schools targeted by Syrian regime forces were the following:

Table 2
Attacks on medical facilities and schools

Date	*Facility*	*Location*	*Description*	*Medical personnel affected*
3 May	Seif al-Dawla teaching centre	Aleppo	Barrel-bomb attack	7 deaths
7 May	Hama Central Hospital	Idlib	Barrel-bomb attack	1 death, 5 injured
13 May	Al-Quds Hospital	Aleppo	Barrel-bomb attack	1 death
16 May	Hama Central Hospital	Idlib	Missile attack	2 injured
23 May	Qastun Health Centre	Hama	Barrel-bomb attack	1 death
24 May	Kafr Zita Specialty Hospital	Hama	Barrel-bomb attack	1 death

Sieges of populated areas

5. The Syrian regime continued its sieges of eastern Ghouta and Darayya, besieging over 163,500 and 4,000 people, respectively, and denying humanitarian agencies access to civilians in need. The regime's siege of Darayya has now been ongoing for close to three years.

Arbitrary detention and torture

6. The Syrian regime continued to detain, torture and kill Syrians in prisons throughout the country. The Counter-terrorism Court, established in 2012, prosecuted human rights defenders, whom it accused of engaging in pro-opposition activities. The Violations Documentation Centre in Syria estimates that, since 1 May

2015, no fewer than 100 Syrian detainees have been tortured to death or executed in Syrian regime prisons.

7. On 13 May, the verdict for human rights activists Mazen Darwish, Director of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression; Hani Zitani, a university professor; and Hussein Ghreir was delayed for the tenth time. All three were last seen on 6 May in Adhra prison, after which they were transferred to an undisclosed location.